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THE “DEMAND SIDE” OF TRANSNATIONAL 
BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION:  
WHY LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD 
ON THE SUPPLY SIDE ISN’T ENOUGH 
Lucinda A. Low,* Sarah R. Lamoree** & John London*** 
INTRODUCTION 
The domestic and international legal framework for combating bribery 
and corruption (“ABC laws”), including both private and public corrupt 
practices that are transnational (cross border) in character, has dramatically 
expanded over the last twenty years.  Despite these developments, major 
gaps remain.  This Article examines one of the largest systemic gaps:  the 
absence of effective tools to control the demand side of transnational 
bribery and corruption—the corrupt solicitation of a benefit1—especially 
when it involves a public official. 
Virtually every country has laws criminalizing bribery and corruption of 
public officials in the domestic context.  Many of these laws are demand-
side (also known as “passive” bribery) laws—meaning that they focus on 
the person who solicits or receives a bribe.2  Others are supply-side (also 
known as “active” bribery) laws—meaning that they focus on the person 
who offers, promises, authorizes, or pays a bribe.3  Some countries’ 
 
*  Partner, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, Washington, D.C.  This Article is part of a symposium 
entitled Fighting Corruption in America and Abroad held at Fordham University School of 
Law.  For an overview of the symposium, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Foreword:  
Fighting Corruption in America and Abroad, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 407 (2015).  Portions of 
this Article are derived from previous publications of the author. 
**  Of Counsel, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, Washington, D.C. 
***  Associate, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, Washington, D.C. 
 
 1. Transparency International defines corruption as the “abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain.” How Do You Define Corruption?, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https:// 
www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption#define (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma. 
cc/K7VE-C4EP]. 
 2. See, e.g., Código Penal Federal [CPF], art. 222(I), Diario Oficial de la Federación 
[DOF] 05-01-1983, últimos reformas DOF 12-03-2015 (Mex.), translated in INT’L BAR 
ASSOC., REPORT ON THE TASK FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 207 n.1 (Apr. 14, 
2009) [hereinafter TASK FORCE] (providing that bribery is committed when “a public servant, 
or a person acting on their . . . behalf, improperly requests or receives, for themselves or on 
behalf of another person, money or any other gift, or accepts a promise for doing or omitting 
to do something legal or illegal in relation to their duties”). 
 3. See, e.g., id. art. 222(II) (providing that bribery is committed when “[a] person 
spontaneously gives or offers money or any other gift to the persons mentioned in the 
foregoing paragraph, in order that a public servant might do or omit to do something legal or 
illegal related to their duties”). 
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legislation targets other actors as well, such as persons who are engaged in 
“trading in influence” and intermediaries.4 
Prior to the mid-1970s, ABC legislation focused on domestic (national) 
acts of corruption.  The adoption of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
of 19775 (FCPA) criminalized transnational bribery—the bribery of foreign 
public officials—as well.  Although the FCPA was the sole transnational 
bribery (TNB) statute in existence until the late 1990s, international 
anticorruption standards have developed rapidly since its adoption.  Of 
particular significance is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s Convention on Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions (“OECD Convention”), a 
targeted instrument that focuses exclusively on the issue of TNB from the 
supply side by requiring its criminalization in national laws.6  Other 
international treaties, broader in scope, also require criminalization of 
TNB.7  Today, as a consequence, dozens of countries have statutes that 
prohibit TNB in international business.8 
At the same time that capital-exporting countries have moved to 
criminalize TNB, many countries have expanded and updated their 
domestic ABC laws, particularly in relation to the public sector.  These 
developments are by no means exclusive to the criminal or penal arena; the 
prevention, detection, or punishment of corruption is also a focus of civil 
and administrative measures at the national and international levels, 
including in the areas of accounting standards,9 eligibility for government 
benefits (e.g., contracts or public financing),10 tax laws (generally affecting 
the availability of tax benefits such as deductions),11 and others.12 
 
 4. See GRP. OF STATES AGAINST CORRUPTION, FIRST EVALUATION ROUND:  EVALUATION 
REPORT ON FRANCE 39–40 (2001) (discussing French Penal Code Articles 433-1 and 433-2 
involving active and passive trading in influence, respectively). 
 5. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977), 
amended by Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988), and Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 
3302 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 6. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Convention]. 
 7. See, e.g., U.N. Convention Against Corruption, opened for signature Dec. 9, 2003, 
2349 U.N.T.S. 41 (entered into force Dec. 14, 2005) [hereinafter U.N. Convention]; 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, E.T.S. No. 173 [hereinafter CoE 
Convention]; Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 
(1996) [hereinafter OAS Convention]. 
 8. The countries with TNB statutes are not limited to the forty-one signatories to the 
OECD Convention.  Nonparties, notably including the People’s Republic of China, have 
enacted or amended their criminal laws so as to cover TNB. See Zhong hua ren min gong he 
guo xing fa xiu zheng an (ba) (中华人民共和国刑法修正案(八)) [Eighth Amendment to the 
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 25, 2011, effective May 1, 2011), http://en.pkulaw.cn/display. 
aspx?cgid=145719&lib=law [http://perma.cc/5MUX-A2JD]. 
 9. See OECD Convention, supra note 6, art. 8.  Article 8 of the OECD Convention, for 
instance, requires countries to take steps to prohibit slush funds, off-book accounts, and 
similar accounting devices and to establish effective, proportionate, and dissuasive civil, 
administrative, or criminal penalties for accounting offenses. See id.  Other ABC 
conventions have similar provisions. 
 10. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], OECD Council Recommendation 
on Bribery and Officially Supported Export Credits, at 2–4, TD/ECG(2006)24 (Dec. 18, 
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Enforcement of TNB laws is uneven.  Only a handful of OECD 
Convention countries have demonstrated active enforcement since the 
treaty’s adoption.13  In the United States, however, enforcement of the 
FCPA has been at record levels for several years.14  In 2014, the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) imposed the largest sanction to date—a $772 
million criminal penalty on Alstom S.A. for bribery in the pursuit of power 
contracts in Indonesia and elsewhere.15  Furthermore, in 2014, the DOJ and 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the two entities that enforce 
the FCPA, cumulatively collected $1.56 billion in penalties.16 
 
2006), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?doclanguage= 
en&cote=td/ecg(2006)24 (discussing government export credits) [http://perma.cc/25GW-
CT82]; European Bank for Reconstruction and Dev. [EBRD], Sound Business Standards and 
Corporate Practices:  A Set of Standards, at 5–8, Pub. No. 2829 (Sept. 1997), 
http://www.ebrd.com/documents/comms-and-bis/pdf-sound-business-standards.pdf 
(discussing ABC rules in international financial institutions (IFIs)) [http://perma.cc/6WZQ-
TVHJ]; World Bank, Guidelines:  Procurement Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits, at 7 
(Jan. 1999), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROCUREMENT/Resources/ProcGuid-
01-99-ev3.pdf (same) [http://perma.cc/LR9A-MLE8]. 
 11. Pursuant to OECD, Revised Recommendation of the Council on Combating Bribery 
in International Business Transactions, C(97)123/FINAL (May 30, 1997), 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=C(97)123/FINAL
&docLanguage=En [http://perma.cc/Y3X7-NHF9], which urges prompt implementation of 
OECD, Recommendation on Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials, 
C(96)27/FINAL (Apr. 17, 1996), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplay 
documentpdf/?doclanguage=en&cote=c(96)27/final [http://perma.cc/RAJ8-5XHP], virtually 
all OECD countries have eliminated the tax deductibility of bribes.  Other treaties call for the 
elimination of tax deductibility as well. See, e.g., U.N. Convention, supra note 7, art. 12(4). 
 12. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. 130.9 (2014).  U.S. export controls applicable to military goods 
and technology require the reporting, inter alia, of commissions paid to intermediates. See id.  
A number of countries prohibit altogether the use of intermediaries in certain types of 
procurement, e.g., defense. See, e.g., Royal Decree No. M12 dated 21/1/1398H (Saudi 
Arabia), reprinted in Saudi Arabia:  Royal Decree No. M/12, Dated 13 Jamada L’ula 1412 
AH, 8 ARAB L.Q. 62, 62–71 (1993). 
 13. See OECD, Annual Report of the OECD Working Group on Bribery 2014, at 18 
(2014), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGB-AB-AnnRep-2014-EN.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/9Z9G-D75H]; OECD, Working Group on Bribery:  2013 Data on Enforcement of Anti-
Bribery Convention, at 4–6 (Sept. 2014), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Working-
Group-on-Bribery-Enforcement-Data-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/XU5C-QFR9]; 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, EXPORTING CORRUPTION:  PROGRESS REPORT 2014:  ASSESSING 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING FOREIGN BRIBERY 2 (2014), 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/exporting_corruption_progress_report_2
014_assessing_enforcement_of_the_oecd [http://perma.cc/N87R-TA8V]. 
 14. STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP, 2014 FCPA YEAR IN REVIEW i–ii, 1–4 (2015), 
http://www.steptoe.com/assets/htmldocuments/Steptoe_2014_FCPA_YIR.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/PTK6-RXRD]. 
 15. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alstrom Pleads Guilty & Agrees to Pay $772 
Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Charges (Dec. 22, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alstom-pleads-guilty-and-agrees-pay-772-million-criminal-
penalty-resolve-foreign-bribery [http://perma.cc/UQ7Q-GRWB’].  Like a number of major 
FCPA cases against foreign companies, this case was settled as a books and records and 
internal control case, not as an antibribery case. See id. 
 16. STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP, supra note 14, at i, 2. 
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Additionally, some other countries have brought major enforcement 
actions.17  Moreover, the World Bank (or “Bank”) has begun to hold 
contractors and consultants on Bank-financed projects responsible for 
corrupt practices through sanctions that include ineligibility to participate in 
such projects permanently or for a term of years.18 
TNB statutes can provide broad jurisdiction over nationals and 
nonnationals, companies and individuals, and intermediaries, but they 
typically do not cover the bribe recipient, even where the recipient has 
solicited or extorted the bribe payment.19  Prosecution of the demand side 
of bribery is generally left to the host country, particularly when the 
recipient is a public official.20  However, weak enforcement mechanisms, 
the lack of political will, official immunities, and other barriers leave the 
vast majority of bribe recipients unprosecuted.21  This Article reviews the 
domestic and international legal framework that has arisen to combat 
bribery and corruption and the mechanisms to recover the proceeds of 
bribery and corruption.  Part I examines the supply side of this framework.  
Part II reviews the demand side.  Part III considers the various steps that 
could be taken to bring greater balance to the system and accountability to 
the demand side. 
I.  THE FCPA AND OTHER TNB REGIMES 
Beginning with the FCPA, the progenitor of all transnational bribery laws 
and norms, this part traces the emergence of international standards, with a 
particular focus on their jurisdictional reach.  After reviewing the FCPA’s 
several antibribery provisions in Part I.A, each of which has its own distinct 
scope, the Article examines the international treaty regime in Part I.B, 
national implementing legislation in Part I.C, and the harmonized standards 
of the international development institutions in Part I.D. 
 
 17. See, e.g., Press Release, SBM Offshore, SBM Offshore Achieves Settlement with 
Dutch Public Prosecutor’s Office Over Alleged Improper Payments.  United States 
Department of Justice Closes Out the Matter (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.sbmoffshore.com/ 
?press-release=sbm-offshore-achieves-settlement-dutch-public-prosecutors-office-alleged-
improper-payments-united-states-department-justice-closes-matter (describing enforcement 
in the Netherlands) [http://perma.cc/4RK4-R4JR]; Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, UK 
Printing Co. & Two Men Found Guilty in Corruption Trial (Dec. 22, 2014), 
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2014/uk-printing-
company-and-two-men-found-guilty-in-corruption-trial.aspx (describing enforcement in the 
United Kingdom) [http://perma.cc/JL4C-YH9S]; Press Release, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, 
Int’l Law Advisory—Record US & German Settlements of the Siemens Case Reflect New 
Realities of Corruption Cases (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.steptoe.com/resources-detail-
5819.html (describing enforcement in Germany) [http://perma.cc/ST7E-KPKV]. 
 18. Lucinda A. Low & Brigida Benitez, Another Context—The Sanctions Regime of the 
World Bank and Other IFIs, WORLD ECR, Sept. 2014, at 30. 
 19. Economic extortion is typically not a defense to paying a bribe. See CRIMINAL DIV. 
OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & THE ENF’T DIV. OF THE SEC, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 27 (2012) [hereinafter FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE], 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/9FN5-D9S7]. 
 20. But see infra Part II.C (discussing notable exceptions to this trend). 
 21. See infra Part II.B. 
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A.  The FCPA 
The FCPA’s enactment in 1977 represented the first attempt to 
criminalize TNB in international business.22  The FCPA focuses on the 
bribery of foreign public officials (defined autonomously) and certain other 
categories of specified recipients.23  Its prohibitions apply to companies as 
well as natural persons.24  Since 1988, the law has permitted corporate 
employees to be prosecuted whether or not their employer is prosecuted.25 
The FCPA’s concept of bribery is transactional—meaning that it is based 
on the concept of quid pro quo.  For the elements of bribery under the 
FCPA to be satisfied, “anything of value” must be “corruptly” given to a 
covered recipient, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of securing action, 
inaction, advantage, or influence in order to “obtain[] . . . retain[] . . . , or 
direct[] business to, any person.”26 
Although all of the elements of bribery under the FCPA are broad in 
scope, the FCPA does not cover all acts of TNB.  The FCPA is a supply-
side statute; it only focuses on those offering, promising, making, 
authorizing, or furthering an improper payment, but not on those receiving, 
soliciting, or agreeing to receive one.27  Moreover, through its limited 
exception for so-called “facilitating payments,” the drafters made clear their 
intention to focus on grand, not petty, corruption.28  Additionally, a 1988 
amendment to the statute created an affirmative defense for legal payments 
under the written laws of the host country and also took into account local 
standards of conduct.29 
Despite these limitations on its reach rationae materiae, the FCPA’s 
antibribery provisions represent a unilateral assertion of jurisdiction over 
extraterritorial conduct.  For so-called “issuers”—companies with a class of 
listed securities subject to federal securities laws—the FCPA not only 
prohibits bribery, but also imposes positive accounting requirements for a 
company’s books, records, and internal accounting controls.30  Although 
 
 22. However, previously, the United States eliminated the tax deductibility of bribes, 
including foreign bribes. I.R.C. § 162(c) (2014). 
 23. These include political parties, party officials, candidates for political office, and 
persons “acting in an official capacity.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a)(2), (f)(1) (2012).  The 1998 
amendments added officials of public international organizations. Id. § f(1). 
 24. Id. § g(2). 
 25. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 
1107 (1988) (eliminating the so-called “Eckhardt amendment”); see H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, 
at 923–24 (1987). 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a). 
 27. Id. §§ 78dd-1 to -3. 
 28. Id. § 78dd-2(b).  The exception is for payments to secure “routine governmental 
action.” Id. §§ 78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b).  This exception has created conflicts with 
both host country domestic laws and, more recently, other TNB laws, most of which treat 
such payments as bribes. 
 29. Id. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1), 78dd-3(c)(1).  Payments consistent with local 
custom and/or practice do not qualify for this defense. 
 30. Id. § 78dd-1 (describing antibribery prohibition for issuers).  These provisions are 
enforced civilly and administratively by the SEC and criminally (for willful violations) by 
the DOJ. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 19, at 4–5.  The term “issuers” includes 
foreign companies that qualify as issuers as well as U.S. firms. Id. at 10–11.  All of the 
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the FCPA’s antibribery provisions—unlike some other laws and regulations 
from the same time period of its enactment—do not treat foreign 
subsidiaries as persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction,31 the FCPA nonetheless 
revolutionized the compliance practices of U.S. multinationals.32  
Moreover, because the FCPA makes parent companies strictly liable for 
their majority-owned U.S. and foreign subsidiaries’ compliance with the 
FCPA and establishes certain responsibilities even with respect to minority-
owned affiliates,33 the accounting provisions have had even more profound 
implications for multinational “issuers.” 
The FCPA’s jurisdictional provisions were originally strictly territorial, 
requiring the “use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce corruptly in furtherance of” the improper payment.34  This 
provision, similar to those found in other federal antifraud statutes,35 
provided an expansive jurisdictional basis that permitted prosecutions to 
take place on the basis of telephone calls or email transmissions with a U.S. 
nexus, or use of the U.S. banking system.36  In other words, the entirety of 
the conduct did not have to take place in the United States; a single act “in 
furtherance of” the bribery that touched U.S. interstate or foreign commerce 
would suffice. 
Nonetheless, this jurisdictional reach proved limiting in some cases.  
Upon the United States’s adherence to the OECD Convention in 1998, the 
FCPA’s jurisdictional provisions were expanded to: 
 
 authorize alternative jurisdiction over “U.S. persons” (a term 
defined to include U.S. citizens, permanent resident aliens, and 
all forms of business enterprises organized under U.S. law) based 
on nationality as an alternative to territorial jurisdiction; 
 
 establish a new antibribery prohibition, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3, 
which prohibits corrupt practices by “any person” (effectively 
 
provisions of the FCPA applicable to “issuers” are part of the federal securities laws. See id. 
at 38.  The accounting provisions are not limited to transactions implicating the antibribery 
provisions, but apply to all transactions and recordkeeping of the issuer. See id. at 38–41. 
 31. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1) (defining “domestic concern” under the FCPA), 
with 15 C.F.R. § 769.1(b) (1989) (defining “United States person” under antiboycott 
regulations). 
 32. This is a function of several factors:  its vicarious liability provisions, which have 
transformed how companies need to approach relationships with an ever-expanding group of 
third parties, vicarious liability standards for the acts of employees, enforcement 
expectations regarding corporate compliance programs, and the benefits of an effective 
program in an enforcement context. 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6).  The internal control provisions of the FCPA require 
“issuers” to use good faith efforts to cause minority-owned affiliates to comply with these 
requirements. See id. 
 34. Id. § 78dd-3(a). 
 35. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (providing jurisdiction for mail fraud); id. § 1343 
(providing jurisdiction for wire fraud). 
 36. Legislative History, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/ 
legislative-history [http://perma.cc/X5FE-NEAF]; FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 19, at 
11–12. 
2015] TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION 569 
non-U.S. persons not covered as issuers) based on an act in 
furtherance of the improper payment “while in the territory of the 
United States”; and 
 
 permit penalties to be imposed on officers, directors, 
shareholders, employees, and agents of domestic concerns or 
issuers without those parties being “otherwise subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States”—thereby permitting personal 
jurisdiction to be asserted over foreign nationals based on, for 
example, solely transitory connections to U.S. territory.37 
 
The FCPA has never asserted universal jurisdiction over foreign supply-
side bribery, nor has its enforcement been based, with perhaps one 
exception, on “effects” jurisdiction.38  Nor has passive personality been the 
basis for jurisdiction.39  Finally, as the absence of language referencing the 
solicitation, receipt, or demand for an improper payment makes clear, it 
does not reach the demand side of a bribery transaction. 
B.  Treaty Regimes 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the international community began to 
collectively act against corruption.  The result has been dramatic:  the 
negotiation, rapid entry into force, and almost universal acceptance of 
anticorruption treaties resulted in a host of new civil and criminal ABC 
measures at the national level, a new architecture for international 
cooperation in investigations and enforcement, new ABC rules in 
international financial institutions, the elimination of tax deductibility of 
bribes in many countries, the promulgation as “soft law” of compliance 
standards, new civil liability provisions, and other measures.  The 
prohibition of transnational bribery, domestic bribery, and corruption, 
particularly in business activities, can therefore be seen as an emerging 
international public policy norm. 
 
 37. Lucinda A. Low & Timothy P. Trenkle, U.S. Antibribery Law Goes Global:  
Standards Tightening Up, 8 BUS. L. TODAY 14, 16–20 (1999) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-3, 
78dd-2(g) and citing id. §§ 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(i)). 
 38. In 2001, the SEC and DOJ jointly prosecuted the Indonesian affiliate of KPMG and 
one of its named partners, Sonny Harsono, for actions taken in Indonesia, which the 
government argued were intended to induce action by personnel of a KPMG client located in 
the United States. Litigation Release No. 17127, SEC, SEC and Department of Justice File 
First-Ever Joint Civil Action Against KPMG Siddhartha Siddhartha & Harsono and Its 
Partner Sonny Harsono for Authorizing the Payment of a Bribe in Indonesia (Sept. 12, 
2001), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17127.htm [http://perma.cc/D66P-
EM5W].  The case was settled, Order, In re Baker Hughes, Inc., No. 44784 (SEC Sept. 12, 
2001), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-44784.htm [http://perma.cc/SNZ2-QHY7], 
so the government’s theory of jurisdiction, derived from other provisions of the federal 
securities laws, was not tested judicially. 
 39. Thus, the fact that a U.S. person is a victim of foreign bribery, e.g., by a competitor, 
does not confer FCPA jurisdiction.  However, a victim may bring a civil suit and may seek 
to recover penalties collected by the government in a criminal case. See infra note 46 and 
accompanying text (discussing the asset recovery provisions of U.N. Convention). 
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Today, there are at least six major ABC treaties: 
1. The OECD Convention (1997); 
2. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (“OAS 
Convention”) (1996); 
3. The Civil Law Convention on Corruption (“CoE Convention”) 
(1999) and its Additional Protocol;40 
4. The Convention Drawn Up on the Basis of Article K.3(2)(c) of 
the Treaty on European Union on the Fight Against Corruption 
Involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of 
Member States of the European Union dated 25 June 1997 (“E.U. 
Convention”);41 
5. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption of July 11, 2003 (“A.U. Convention”);42 and 
6. The United Nations. Convention Against Corruption (“U.N. 
Convention”) (2003).43 
The scopes of these treaties range from narrow to sweeping.  At one end 
of the spectrum, the OECD Convention focuses narrowly on measures to 
combat TNB, primarily through supply-side criminalization (or equivalent 
civil liability) requirements.44  At the other end of the spectrum, the U.N. 
Convention encompasses preventing and sanctioning—through civil, 
criminal, and other means—a wide range of practices on both the supply 
and demand sides,45 as well as establishing a new set of mechanisms for 
international asset recovery.46 
 
 40. Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, opened for 
signature May 15, 2003, E.T.S. No. 191 (entered into force Feb. 1, 2005); see supra notes 6–
7 and accompanying text (discussing the OECD Convention, OAS Convention, and CoE 
Convention). 
 41. The Convention Drawn Up on the Basis of Article K.3(2)(c) of the Treaty on 
European Union on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European 
Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union, June 25, 1997, 1997 
O.J. (C 195), [hereinafter E.U. Convention], http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ 
.do?uri=CELEX:41997A0625(01):EN:HTML [http://perma.cc/Z4X8-CFKP]. 
 42. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 11, 2003, 
43 I.L.M. 5 (2004) (entered into force Aug. 5, 2006) [hereinafter A.U. Convention]. 
 43. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the U.N. Convention). 
 44. OECD Convention, supra note 6, art. 1.1 (stating that “[e]ach Party shall” establish a 
criminal offense for any person to “offer, promise or give” an “undue pecuniary or other 
advantage” to a “foreign public official”).  The OECD Convention contains additional 
provisions designed to harness anti-money laundering laws for the prosecution of corruption 
and accounting requirements (primarily civil). Id. arts. 7–8.  Related OECD initiatives have 
focused on the elimination of tax deductibility of bribes and measures to combat bribery in 
officially supported export credits. See supra note 10. 
 45. See, e.g., U.N. Convention, supra note 7, art. 9.1 (requiring “States Part[ies]” to 
“establish appropriate systems of procurement, based on transparency, competition and 
objective criteria in decision-making . . . ”); id. art. 10(a) (requiring “States Part[ies]” to 
“enhance transparency in its public administration” by “[a]dopting procedures or regulations 
allowing members of the general public to obtain, where appropriate, information on the 
organization, functioning and decision-making processes of its public administration . . . ”); 
id. art. 12 (requiring “States Part[ies]” to “enhance accounting and auditing standards in the 
private sector and, where appropriate, provide effective, proportionate and dissuasive civil 
administrative or criminal penalties . . . ”); id. art. 15(a)–(b) (requiring “State Part[ies]” to 
adopt legislation criminalizing both the “promise, offering or giving, to a public 
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The regional treaties’ scopes are closer to the U.N. Convention’s scope 
because they include criminalization, preventive, and cooperative 
provisions.47  For example, the CoE Convention has a separate treaty on 
civil liability.48 
Moreover, all of these treaties contain mechanisms for international 
cooperation in investigations and enforcement, including enhanced mutual 
legal assistance and extradition standards.49  While the international 
cooperation provisions of these treaties are generally self-executing, the 
criminalization provisions generally require implementation at the national 
level within the parameters of each country’s domestic legal system.50 
All of these treaties, like the FCPA, require countries to criminalize 
supply-side TNB.51  Other acts of corruption are subject to either 
mandatory or permissive criminalization requirements of varying scope, 
depending on the terms of the treaty.  These include: 
 
 domestic official bribery (both active and passive) (U.N., A.U., 
CoE, E.U., and OAS Conventions);52 
 
 private sector bribery (both the supply and the demand sides) 
(U.N., A.U., and CoE Conventions);53 
 
official . . . an undue advantage” and the “solicitation or acceptance by a public 
official . . . of an undue advantage”). 
 46. U.N. Convention, supra note 7, ch. V. 
 47. However, only the A.U. Convention, Article 16 includes provisions on asset 
recovery. See A.U. Convention, supra note 42, art. 16. 
 48. Civil Law Convention on Corruption, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1999, E.T.S. No. 
174 (entered into force Nov. 1, 2003). 
 49. U.N. Convention, supra note 7, ch. IV; A.U. Convention, supra note 42, arts. 15, 18; 
CoE Convention, supra note 7, ch. IV; E.U. Convention, supra note 41, art. 9; OECD 
Convention, supra note 6, arts. 9, 10; OAS Convention, supra note 7, arts. XIII, XIV. 
 50. U.N. Convention, supra note 7, arts. 15, 16 (stating “Part[ies] . . . shall adopt such 
legislative and other measures . . . ”); A.U. Convention, supra note 42, art. 5 (stating that 
Parties will “[a]dopt legislative and other measures that are required to establish as offenses” 
certain corrupt acts); CoE Convention, supra note 7, arts. 4, 5 (“Each Party shall adopt such 
legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences . . . .”); 
E.U. Convention, supra note 41, arts. 2(2), 3(2) (“Each Member State shall take the 
necessary measures to ensure that conduct of the type referred to in paragraph 1 is made a 
criminal offence.”); OECD Convention, supra note 6, art. 1 (stating “[e]ach [p]arty shall take 
measures as may be necessary to establish it is a criminal offence . . . ”); OAS Convention, 
supra note 7, art. VII (“The State Parties that have not yet done so shall adopt the necessary 
legislative or other measures to establish as criminal offenses under their domestic 
law . . . .”). 
 51. U.N. Convention, supra note 7, art. 16; A.U. Convention, supra note 42, art. 4(1)(b); 
CoE Convention, supra note 7, art. 5; E.U. Convention, supra note 41, art. 3(1); OECD 
Convention, supra note 6, art. 1; OAS Convention, supra note 7, art. VIII. But see infra Part 
II.A. (discussing the treatment of demand-side TNB by these treaties). 
 52. U.N. Convention, supra note 7, art. 15; A.U. Convention, supra note 42, art. 4(1)(b), 
CoE Convention, supra note 7, arts. 2, 3; E.U. Convention, supra note 41, arts. 2, 3; OAS 
Convention, supra note 7, art. VI. 
 53. U.N. Convention, supra note 7, art. 21; A.U. Convention, supra note 42, arts. 
4(1)(e), 11; CoE Convention, supra note 7, arts. 7, 8.  Although the E.U. Convention only 
addresses public corruption, other E.U. instruments focus on private-sector corruption. See, 
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 trading in influence (both the supply and the demand side) (U.N., 
A.U., and CoE Conventions);54 
 
 money laundering based on corruption as a predicate offense 
(persons transacting in the proceeds of bribery can include 
officials on the demand side of the bribery transaction) (U.N., 
CoE, and OECD Conventions);55 
 
 illicit enrichment of public officials (U.N., A.U., and OAS 
Conventions);56 
 
 conspiracy, aiding, and abetting (supply and demand side, 
depending on the treaty and the offense) (U.N., A.U., CoE, 
OECD, and OAS Conventions);57 and 
 
 others, including many on the demand side.58 
 
With the exception of the OECD Convention,59 these treaties’ 
jurisdictional provisions are not specifically tied to particular ABC 
offenses, but are general jurisdictional provisions.  Some jurisdictional 
provisions may be less apposite for particular offenses than others.  This 
section will review the various provisions for jurisdiction in the 
Conventions.  First, it describes the general approach that the conventions 
take regarding ABC and other offenses.  It will then discuss three types of 
 
e.g., Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003, On Combating 
Corruption in the Private Sector, 2003 O.J. (L 192) 54–56. 
 54. U.N. Convention, supra note 7, art. 18; A.U. Convention, supra note 42, art. 4(1)(f); 
CoE Convention, supra note 7, art. 12. 
 55. U.N. Convention, supra note 7, art. 23; CoE Convention, supra note 7, art. 13; 
OECD Convention, supra note 6, art. 7. 
 56. U.N. Convention, supra note 7, art. 20; A.U. Convention, supra note 42, art. 8; OAS 
Convention, supra note 7, art. IX. 
 57. U.N. Convention, supra note 7, art. 27; A.U. Convention, supra note 42, art. 4(1)(i); 
CoE Convention, supra note 7, art. 15; OECD Convention, supra note 6, art. 1(2); OAS 
Convention, supra note 7, art. VI(1)(e). 
 58. The OAS Convention includes among its “acts of corruption” the fraudulent 
use/concealment of property (which is broader but could include money laundering), 
improper acts or omissions by public officials, improper use of state information or property 
by public officials, diversion of state property for personal benefit, and others. OAS 
Convention, supra note 7, arts. VI(1), XI.  The U.N. Convention defines a wide range of acts 
of corruption in Chapter 3, including embezzlement, misappropriation, or other division of 
property by a public official, U.N. Convention, supra note 7, art. 17; abuse of functions, id. 
art. 19; concealment, id. art. 24; and obstruction of justice, id. art. 25.  The CoE Convention 
requires the adoption of accounting offenses. COE Convention, supra note 7, art. 14.  The 
A.U. Convention treats as “acts of corruption” abuses of authority, division of property for 
personal benefit, and concealment of proceeds. A.U. Convention, supra note 42, art. 4(c)–
(d), (h). 
 59. The OECD Convention, as indicated earlier, is a targeted instrument focused on 
supply-side TNB. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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jurisdictional provisions:  territory, nationality, and other mandatory bases 
of jurisdiction. 
1.  General Approach 
Territoriality is the primary jurisdictional basis for these treaties’ ABC 
offenses.  Each convention contains a provision for territorial jurisdiction60 
and some degree of jurisdiction based on nationality.61  All of the treaties 
except the A.U. Convention call for participating countries to adopt 
measures in national laws that implement the convention’s standards on 
jurisdiction.62  Where the underlying convention language is mandatory 
(“shall”), these bases of jurisdiction must be adopted; in other cases it will 
be permissive (“may”).63  However, virtually all of the treaties adopt a 
“floor” approach, whereby a country may adopt more extensive bases of 
jurisdiction than those required by the treaty.64 
2.  Territorial Jurisdiction Provisions 
Most of these treaties require the establishment of jurisdiction over ABC 
offenses where the offense is committed “in whole or in part” in a country’s 
territory.65  However, two of the treaties—the OAS Convention and the 
U.N. Convention—omit the “or in part” language, requiring that 
jurisdiction be established when “the offense is committed in” the territory 
of the state party.66  Because ABC offenses are typically complex, with 
multiple elements, the latter may permit countries to establish a narrow 
basis for territorial jurisdiction that is ill-suited to the prosecution of TNB in 
 
 60. A.U. Convention, supra note 42, art. 13(1)(a); OECD Convention, supra note 6, art. 
4(1); E.U. Convention, supra note 41, art. 7(1)(a); OAS Convention, supra note 7, art. V(2). 
 61. U.N. Convention, supra note 7, art. 42(2)(a) (permitting nationality jurisdiction 
subject to the principles of the territorial sovereignty of other states); CoE Convention, supra 
note 7, art. 17(1)(b); A.U. Convention, supra note 42, art. 13(1)(b); OECD Convention, 
supra note 6, art. 4(2) (permitting nationality jurisdiction to the extent the state concerned 
has jurisdiction to prosecute its nationals for offenses committed abroad); E.U. Convention, 
supra note 41, art. 7(1)(b); OAS Convention, supra note 7, art. V(2) (permitting, but not 
mandating, states to establish nationality jurisdiction over corruption offenses). 
 62. U.N. Convention, supra note 7, art. 42 (stating “[e]ach State Party shall adopt such 
measures . . . ”); A.U. Convention, supra note 42, art. 13 (stating “[e]ach State Party has 
jurisdiction over . . . ”); CoE Convention, supra note 7, art. 17 (stating “[e]ach Party shall 
adopt such legislation . . . ”); E.U. Convention, supra note 41, art. 7 (stating “[e]ach Member 
State shall take the measures necessary to establish its jurisdiction . . . ”); OECD 
Convention, supra note 6, art. 4 (stating “[e]ach Party shall take such measures . . . ”); OAS 
Convention, supra note 7, art. V(1), (2) (establishing that it is mandatory to adopt territorial 
jurisdiction and permitted to adopt nationality jurisdiction). 
 63. Compare OAS Convention, supra note 7, art. XIII(4) (using mandatory language), 
with id. art XIII(3) (using permissive language). 
 64. U.N. Convention, supra note 7, art. 42(2); CoE Convention, supra note 7, art. 17(2); 
E.U. Convention, supra note 41, art. 7(2); OECD Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(2); OAS 
Convention, supra note 7, art. V(1)–(2). 
 65. CoE Convention, supra note 7, art. 17(1)(a); A.U. Convention, supra note 42, art. 
13(1)(a); OECD Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(1); E.U. Convention, supra note 41, art. 
7(1)(a). 
 66. U.N. Convention, supra note 7, art. 42(1)(a); OAS Convention, supra note 7, art. 
V(1). 
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particular.  The former, in contrast, permit territorial jurisdiction to be 
established in a much wider array of circumstances and will result in a 
higher incidence of concurrent jurisdiction (assuming conduct occurs in 
multiple countries).  Indeed, to promote enforcement, similar to the FCPA’s 
requirement of an “act in furtherance,” the OECD Convention requires 
states to ensure that the territorial basis of jurisdiction is broad.67 
3.  Nationality Jurisdiction 
These treaties also take different approaches to nationality jurisdiction.  
Three of these treaties require countries to establish jurisdiction over 
offenses committed by their nationals.68  One of these treaties requires it 
only of countries that already exercise nationality jurisdiction.69  Two of 
these treaties make it permissive but not mandatory to do so.70  This variety 
may reflect the fact that nationality is a less well-established basis of 
jurisdiction in criminal law systems generally.71  However, the availability 
of nationality jurisdiction in the context of prosecution for international 
business activities makes the likelihood of extraterritorial application 
virtually certain. 
4.  Other Mandatory Bases of Jurisdiction 
Other mandatory bases of jurisdiction found in certain of these 
Conventions are:  (1) where the offender is present in the territory of a 
country and extradition is refused on the basis of nationality (the aut dedere 
aut judicare rule of international law);72 (2) where the offense involves a 
public official who is a national of a country;73 and (3) where the offense is 
committed on a vessel or aircraft of the country.74  The latter may be seen 
as an extension of territoriality, while the second could be an extension of 
nationality (either active or passive, depending on what “involved” means), 
or protective. 
 
 67. OECD Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(1); OECD, (OECD) Commentaries on 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, art. 4, para. 25, DAFFE/IME/BR(97)17/REV1 (Nov. 26, 1997), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2012/11/14/combatbribe2. 
pdf [http://perma.cc/877E-H7JN]. 
 68. CoE Convention, supra note 7, art. 17(1)(b); A.U. Convention, supra note 42, art. 
13(1)(b); E.U. Convention, supra note 41, art. 7(1)(b). 
 69. OECD Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(2). 
 70. U.N. Convention, supra note 7, art. 42(2)(a); OAS Convention, supra note 7, art. 
V(2). 
 71. See Mark Pieth, Jurisdiction, in THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY:  A 
COMMENTARY §§ 3.2–3.4, at 339–44 (Pieth, Low & Bonucci eds., 2d ed. 2014). 
 72. U.N. Convention, supra note 7, art. 42(4) (not limiting jurisdiction to nationals); 
CoE Convention, supra note 7, art. 17(3); A.U. Convention, supra note 42, art. 13(1)(c); 
OAS Convention, supra note 7, art. V(3). 
 73. CoE Convention, supra note 7, art. 17(1)(c); E.U. Convention, supra note 41, art. 
7(1)(c). 
 74. U.N. Convention, supra note 7, art. 42(1)(b). 
2015] TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION 575 
C.  National TNB Implementing Legislation 
As a result of these treaties, particularly the OECD Convention, many 
countries today have enacted TNB legislation.  The OECD Convention’s 
parties include some emerging countries, such as Brazil and South Africa, 
as well as traditional capital-exporting countries.75  The TNB legislation 
enacted by these countries, while consistent with the scope of the OECD 
Convention, generally focuses on the supply side. 
For example, section 6 of the U.K. Bribery Act defines the TNB offense 
to cover situations where a company gives or offers any “financial or other 
advantage” to a “foreign public official,” either directly or indirectly, with 
the intent to influence the foreign official and to “obtain or retain” 
“business” or “an advantage in the conduct of business.”76  The Canadian 
Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act makes it an offense to “obtain or 
retain an advantage in the course of business” by giving or offering “a loan, 
reward, advantage or benefit of any kind to a foreign public official” in 
exchange for either “an act or omission by the official” in connection with 
that official’s duties or “to induce the official to use his or her position to 
influence any acts” of that official’s organization.77  Finally, the Brazilian 
Clean Company Act, enacted in 2013, provides for strict civil and 
administrative liability for companies that act “against the domestic or 
foreign Public Administration.”78 
D.  World Bank 
Prior to the late 1990s, the World Bank considered it an infringement of 
its member countries’ sovereignty to pursue the fraud or corruption in the 
projects it financed.79  In 1996, President James Wolfensohn, in his now 
famous “cancer of corruption” speech,80 introduced a paradigm-shifting 
element.  Coupled with a change in position regarding its legal authority, 
the Bank embarked on a process of embedding into its lending regime new 
 
 75. See OECD, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions:  Ratification Status As of 21 May 2014, at 1 (2014), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus.pdf [http://perma.cc/G4P9-
4G5D]. 
 76. Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 6 (UK).  Section 2 of the Act introduces a demand-side 
offense that prohibits, among other things, the act of requesting, agreeing to receive or 
accepting “a financial or other advantage intending that, in consequence, a relevant function 
or activity should be performed improperly . . . .” Id. § 2. 
 77. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, S.C. 1998, c. 34, § 3 (Can.). 
 78. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
2.8.2013, arts. 1, 5 (Braz.), translated in TRENCH, ROSSI E WATANABE ADVOGADOS, LAW NO. 
12,846 OF AUGUST 1, 2013 1–2 (2013), http://www.corporatecomplianceforum.com/files/ 
Uploads/Documents/Spain/Compliance/Ley%20Brasil.pdf [http://perma.cc/VEN8-X7C9]. 
 79. Heather Marquette, The Creeping Politicisation of the World Bank:  The Case of 
Corruption, 52 POL. STUDS. 413, 414 (2004). 
 80. John D. Wolfensohn, Address at World Bank Annual Meeting (Oct. 1, 1996), 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/EXTP
RESIDENT/EXTPASTPRESIDENTS/PRESIDENTEXTERNAL/0,,contentMDK:20025269
~menuPK:232083~pagePK:159837~piPK:159808~theSitePK:227585,00.html [http://perma. 
cc/93SK-RPXL]. 
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norms and remedies for these types of misconduct and created institutions 
to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate cases of misconduct. 
The Bank’s guidelines for consultants and contractors were amended to 
include prohibitions on fraud and corruption.81  Project lending documents 
were amended to ensure that countries receiving Bank loans or grants 
incorporated the Bank’s standards of conduct, including flowing them down 
into third-party contracts awarded using those proceeds.82  Additionally, the 
occurrence of misconduct on a Bank-financed project could lead to 
suspension or even termination of Bank support.83 
Unlike the TNB statutes discussed earlier, the World Bank’s 
anticorruption norm is both supply and demand side focused.  A “corrupt 
practice” is defined as the “offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting, directly 
or indirectly, anything of value to influence improperly the actions of 
another party.”84  While actions have been taken against Bank personnel, 
the World Bank’s enforcement focuses on the supply side, with the 
principal sanction consisting of debarment of contractors or consultants 
from eligibility for some period of time.85 
The World Bank’s sanctions are publicly listed on its website.86  As of 
publication, the sanctions list includes over 700 companies and individuals 
from over 100 countries that have been debarred or otherwise sanctioned 
for a range of misconduct, primarily, however, fraud and corruption.87  
 
 81. See generally World Bank, Guidelines:  Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-
Consulting Services Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank 
Borrowers (July 2014), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROCUREMENT/Resources/ 
Procurement_GLs_English_Final_Jan2011_revised_July1-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/5N4U-
VZQ5]; World Bank, Guidelines:  Selection and Employment of Consultants Under IBRD 
Loans and IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowers (July 2014), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROCUREMENT/Resources/Consultant_GLs_Englis
h_Final_Jan2011_Revised_July1_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/DA83-JAQS]. 
 82. World Bank, Guidelines:  Procurement of Goods, Works, & Non-Consulting 
Services Under IBRD Loans & IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowers, § 1.16 
(Jan. 2011), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROCUREMENT/Resources/278019-
1308067833011/Procurement_GLs_English_Final_Jan2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/R6MM-
EDQ2]. 
 83. Id. § 1.16(c). 
 84. WORLD BANK SANCTIONS PROCEDURES app. 1, (A) (WORLD BANK 2012), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/WBGSanctionsProceduresJ
an2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/VV5R-E3TH].  This is a harmonized definition, used by all of 
the IFIs. See INT’L FIN. INSTS. ANTI-CORRUPTION TASK FORCE, UNIFORM FRAMEWORK FOR 
PREVENTING AND COMBATING FRAUD AND CORRUPTION 1 (2006), 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/Uniform_ 
Framework_for_Combatting_Fraud_and_Corruption.pdf [http://perma.cc/M2V3-JMGU]. 
 85. WORLD BANK SANCTIONING GUIDELINES § II.A (WORLD BANK 2011), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/WorldBankSanctioningGui
delines.pdf [http://perma.cc/33LS-LU8D]. 
 86. See World Bank Listing of Ineligible Firms & Individuals, WORLD BANK, 
http://www.worldbank.org/debarr [http://perma.cc/97TY-HW8V]. 
 87. See id. tbl.1.  Table 2 lists firms and individuals that have been conditionally non-
debarred. See id. tbl.2. 
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From published debarment statistics, the current average length of 
debarment sanction is approximately six years.88 
In 2010, five leading International Financial Institutions (IFIs)—the 
African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and the World Bank—agreed to mutually recognize 
each other’s sanctions.89  The cross-debarment agreement applies to 
debarments with terms of more than one year.90 
While many sanctions cases are adjudicated,91 in recent years settlement 
has also become an option.  A number of multinational companies have 
made headlines by negotiating resolutions with the World Bank that have 
included significant monetary elements.92  In 2009, in what remains the 
largest World Bank case in monetary terms, Siemens, in response to bribery 
allegations, reached a settlement with the World Bank in which Siemens 
agreed to make $100 million available for anticorruption projects over the 
next several years, to forgo bidding on World Bank projects for two years, 
and to have its Russian subsidiary debarred for four years.93  In 2012, two 
of Alstom’s subsidiaries, Alstom Hydro France and Alstom Network 
Schweiz AG in Switzerland, paid $9.5 million and agreed to be barred from 
bidding on World Bank contracts for three years.94  Finally, in 2013, SNC 
Lavalin Inc. and more than 100 of its affiliates, in connection with alleged 
misconduct in Bangladesh, reached a settlement in which they would be 
 
 88. Data provided by the World Bank was calculated by this Article’s authors to provide 
an average debarment length, as of September 21, 2015, exclusive of permanent debarments 
and ongoing cases, of 6.06 years. See id. 
 89. Agreement for the Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions (Apr. 9, 2010), 
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/integrity/Debar.pdf [http://perma.cc/FM49-9R7S]. 
 90. Id. art. 4(c).  Additional criteria are:  (1) the debarment decision must be based on 
sanctionable practices contained in the Uniform Framework; (2) the sanctioning IFI must 
have made the decision publicly available; (3) the debarment decision must have been made 
after the cross-debarment agreement was entered into force; (4) the debarment decision must 
have been made within ten years of the sanctionable practice; and (5) the debarment was not 
imposed in recognition of a decision of a national or other international forum. Id. art. 4(a)–
(b), (d)–(f).  An opt-out provision permits a participating IFI not to enforce a debarment 
based on legal or policy considerations. Id. art. 7. 
 91. There is a two-level quasi-administrative process, involving at the first level a 
review of the case by a Suspension and Debarment Officer and an internal World Bank 
official and at the second level a review of the case by a majority-external Sanctions Board. 
See Low & Benitez, supra note 18, at 30–31. 
 92. The World Bank has no authority to impose fines.  It may, however, require 
restitution. WORLD BANK SANCTIONS PROCEDURES, supra note 84, § 9.01(b), (e). 
 93. Press Release, World Bank, Siemens to Pay $100m to Fight Corruption As Part of 
World Bank Group Settlement (July 2, 2009), http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-
cases/sites/corruption-cases/files/Siemens_World_Bank_Settlement_WB_PR_Jul_2_2009. 
pdf [http://perma.cc/ML7J-2549]. 
 94. Press Release, World Bank, Enforcing Accountability:  World Bank Debars Alstrom 
Hydro France, Alstrom Network Schweiz AG & Their Affiliates (Feb. 22, 2012), 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:23123315~menuP
K:51062075~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html [http://perma.cc/5MA6-
LCKW]. 
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debarred for 10 years.95  The terms of the SNC Lavalin settlement represent 
the longest debarment period agreed to in a World Bank-negotiated 
resolution to date.96 
The World Bank also refers cases to national authorities for prosecution.  
These referrals may involve their own officials,97 companies or their 
personnel,98 or officials of the Bank’s Member States.99  The World Bank 
made forty-nine referrals to countries and other multilateral development 
banks in the 2014 fiscal year.100  The Bank’s statistics do not break down 
the referrals, so there is no transparency regarding how many demand-side 
referrals have been made, but there is little evidence that the countries 
receiving these referrals have taken action against the implicated officials. 
II.  THE DEMAND-SIDE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Having reviewed the supply-side legal framework for transnational 
bribery, this Article now turns to the demand-side framework, with a 
particular focus on public officials.  This part starts with treaty provisions 
and national implementing legislation that has a transnational dimension, 
then reviews some examples of territorially focused host country national 
legislation and challenges to enforcement, including official immunities and 
a lack of political will, as well as some examples of enforcement efforts.  
Finally, this part considers other legal tools that are relevant to demand-side 
enforcement, including anti-money laundering laws and asset recovery 
mechanisms. 
 
 95. Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Debars SNC-Lavalin Inc. & Its Affiliates 
for 10 Years (Apr. 17, 2013) [hereinafter SNC-Lavalin], http://www.worldbank.org/ 
en/news/press-release/2013/04/17/world-bank-debars-snc-lavalin-inc-and-its-affiliates-for-
ten-years [http://perma.cc/PXJ9-WUV7]. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former World Bank Employee 
Sentenced for Taking Kickbacks & Assisting in the Bribery of a Foreign Official (Apr. 25, 
2008), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/April/08-crm-341.html [http://perma.cc/ 
C57V-4NUJ]; United States v. Guatam Sengupta Court Docket Number:  02-CR-040-RWR, 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/case/united-states-v-gautam-
sengupta-court-docket-number-02-cr-040-rwr (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/ 
CFX4-V5GK]. 
 98. See, e.g., SNC-Lavalin, supra note 95. 
 99. For example, the World Bank provided information to Canada and the Bangladeshi 
government related to “a high-level corruption conspiracy” by SNC Lavalin and certain 
Bangladeshi government officials for the Padma Bridge project. Press Release, World Bank, 
World Bank Statement of Padma Bridge (June 29, 2012), http://www.worldbank.org/ 
en/news/press-release/2012/06/29/world-bank-statement-padma-bridge [http://perma.cc/ 
T8Z7-7Q82]. 
 100. World Bank Group [WBG], The World Bank Group Integrity Vice Presidency 
Annual Update:  Fiscal Year 2014, at 33 (2014), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/ 
default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/10/09/000442464_20141009092921/Rendered/
PDF/912470BR0SecM2090Box385330B00OUO090.pdf [http://perma.cc/BE48-JVVN].  In 
fiscal year 2012, this number was forty-six. Id. 
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A.  Treaty Provisions and National Implementing Laws 
While many of the treaties discussed above require countries to 
criminalize acts of corruption by public officials in the domestic arena, as 
well as oblige to preventive measures to be taken for such officials, few of 
the treaties address the demand (or passive) side of TNB.  U.N. Convention 
Article 16.2 permits, but does not require, countries to criminalize the 
solicitation or acceptance of a bribe in a transnational context.101  The CoE 
Convention requires that its parties criminalize the involvement of a foreign 
public official in either active or passive bribery.102 
A number of countries have implemented laws criminalizing demand-
side TNB.  An online tool of the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, Tools and Resources for Anti-Corruption Knowledge103 (TRACK), 
contains a searchable database of national laws implementing provisions of 
the U.N. Convention, including Article 16.2.  As of publication, TRACK 
lists nearly fifty states that have provisions relating to U.N. Convention, 
Article 16.2.104  Unsurprisingly, many are parties to the CoE Convention.105  
For example, section 2 of the U.K. Bribery Act does not limit the demand-
side bribery offense to domestic officials only, although prosecution of a 
foreign official would require that the conduct satisfy the Act’s jurisdiction 
provisions.106  Similarly, Germany’s antibribery laws include demand-side 
provisions.107  Furthermore, both European countries—such as France,108 
Poland,109 Serbia,110 and Sweden111—and several non-European 
 
 101. U.N. Convention, supra note 7, art. 16(2) (“Each State Party shall consider adopting 
such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, 
when committed intentionally, the solicitation or acceptance by a foreign public official or 
an official of a public international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue 
advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the 
official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties.”). 
 102. CoE Convention, supra note 7, art. 5 (“Each Party shall adopt such legislative and 
other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law 
the conduct referred to in Articles 2 [active bribery of domestic public officials] and 3 
[passive bribery of domestic public officials], when involving a public official of any other 
State.”). 
 103. TRACK:  On Track Against Corruption, UNODC, http://www.track.unodc.org 
/Pages/home.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/C57D-9SVA]. 
 104. Id. (follow “Legal Library” hyperlink; then follow “Legal Library Search” 
hyperlink; search in “UNCAC Article” search bar for “16.2”).  Not all of these laws relating 
to Article 16.2 are demand-side TNB provisions, however. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 2 (UK). 
 107. See T. Markus Funk & Jess A. Dance, Germany’s Increasingly Robust 
Anticorruption Efforts, 38 LITIG. 56, 56 (2012) (“In contrast to the [FCPA], which does not 
outlaw the receipt of a bribe, German law specifies that accepting or granting an advantage 
and offering or receiving a bribe are all punishable.”). 
 108. CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] [PENAL CODE] arts. 435-1, 435-3 (Fr.). 
 109. KODEKS KARNY [K.K.] [PENAL CODE] art. 228 (Pol.). 
 110. Krivični Zakon [K.Z.] [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 367 (Serb.). 
 111. See BROTTSBALKEN [BrB] [CRIMINAL CODE] ch. 20, § 2 (Swed.). 
580 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
countries—such as the Republic of Congo,112 Bolivia,113 and Algeria114—
criminalize demand-side TNB. 
However, even with the promulgation of demand-side TNB laws, there 
have yet to be cases of foreign officials prosecuted for TNB.  Under the 
current system, the prosecution of the solicitation or acceptance of a bribe 
by a public official of a particular country is left to that country, except in 
the unusual cases where movement of the proceeds of the bribery to another 
country enables that country to prosecute the individual using other legal 
tools. 
B.  Host Country Local Laws 
As noted earlier, virtually every country has domestic ABC laws 
covering its public officials.115  Indeed, some countries have multiple laws.  
These laws typically reach the demand side as well as the supply side. 
For example, Indonesia criminalizes a wide range of demand-side 
conduct by public officials.116  Among other conduct, it is an offense for 
“any public officer” to accept a “gift or promise, knowing that it is given to 
him in order to move him, contrary to his duty, to do or to admit something 
in his service.”117  Additionally, Guatemala has numerous statutes on the 
books regulating corruption; for example, its extortion statute prohibits 
officials or public employees, for profit, from using their influence to 
obtain, among other things, the decision of any authority.118  Furthermore, 
Nigeria’s Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act of 2000 
prohibits the “[o]ffence of accepting gratification,” which prohibits a person 
from, among other things, “corruptly” asking, receiving, or obtaining any 
property or benefit “on account of” anything to be done or not done “in the 
discharge of his official duties.”119 
 
 112. See Loi 5-2009 du 22 septembre 2009 sur la corruption, la concussion et la fraude et 
les infractions assimilées en République du Congo [law 5-2009 of September 22, 2009 on 
corruption, bribery, fraud and similar offenses in the Republic of Congo] art. 8. 
 113. See Ley de lucha contra la corrupción, enriquecimiento ilícito e investigación de 
fortunas “Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz” [law on combating corruption, illicit enrichment and 
investigation of [the] fortunes [of] “Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz”] art. 31 (Bol.). 
 114. See Loi 06-01 du 21 Moharram 1427 correspondant au 20 février 2006 relative à la 
prévention et à la lutte contre la corruption [law 06-01 of 21 Moharram 1427 corresponding 
to February 20, 2006 on the prevention and fight against corruption] art. 28 (Alg.). 
 115. See supra INTRODUCTION.  A compilation of anticorruption laws is maintained by the 
Int’l Assoc. of Anti-Corruption Auths., Anti-Corruption Laws by Countries and Regions, 
IAACA, http://www.iaaca.org/AntiCorruptionLaws/ByCountriesandRegions/ (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/7MDN-BF7Q]. 
 116. See Makarim & Taira S., Indonesia:  Indonesia’s Anti-Corruption Laws, MONDAQ, 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/160720/White+Collar+Crime+Fraud/Indonesias+AntiCorruption
+Laws (last updated Jan. 18, 2012) [http://perma.cc/6YKW-JVJF]. 
 117. Wetboek van strafrecht voor Indonesië of 15 Oct 1915 [W.I.] [Indonesian Penal 
Code of October 15, 1915] art. 419, translated in U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, 
INDONESIAN CRIMINAL CODE 68, https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/idn/indonesian_ 
penal_code_html/I.1_Criminal_Code.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/ 
M7QY-TD3A]. 
 118. Codigo Penal de Guatemala [C.P.G.] [Guatemalan Penal Code] art. 449. 
 119. The Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act of 2000 No. (5) (2000), § 8 
(Nigeria). 
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Despite these provisions, significant barriers to demand-side enforcement 
remain, both in terms of the legal framework and the enforcement of the 
norms that have been enacted. 
1.  Immunities 
Public officials typically benefit from immunity from suit and the 
execution of judgment in domestic courts while in office.120  For instance, 
section 308 of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution protects elected officials 
from civil and criminal charges during their tenure in office.121  The 
rationale for immunity is that it protects officials from the distractions that a 
prosecution would create and permits them to focus on the performance of 
their duties while in office.122  In many countries, however, immunity 
receives criticism for fostering corruption and preventing good 
government.123  It is not uncommon for an official to leave office and then 
to be appointed by his political allies to a new official position that will 
confer immunity anew, simply to prevent prosecution for acts of corruption 
committed in his or her prior service.124 
2.  Political Will and Capacity 
Beyond the legal framework, public corruption is political.  The 
prosecution of corruption requires both political will and institutional 
capacity.  This political will is more readily present with political rivals 
than officials of one’s own party.  In addition, the opportunity to prosecute 
corruption may not present itself for many years in countries where a despot 
holds power for a long time.  Furthermore, in countries where the rule of 
law is underdeveloped and institutional capacity, including in the courts, is 
weak, the challenges are multiplied:  the prosecution of corruption often 
 
 120. These individual immunities are entirely separate from the immunities enjoyed by 
states. 
 121. CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA 1999, § 308; see also Solomon Kehinde, The Immunity 
Clause Under the Nigerian 1999 Constitution:  A Curse or Blessing, LAW. CHRON., 
http://thelawyerschronicle.com/the-immunity-clause-under-the-nigerian-1999-constitution-a-
curse-or-blessing/ [http://perma.cc/7BHL-39LS]. 
 122. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 744–45 (1982).  Immunity for public officials is 
widespread throughout both the developed and developing world.  In the United States, 
absolute immunity is extended to public officials performing judicial, legislative, and 
prosecutorial functions, although the scope of such broad immunity is limited. See Burns v. 
Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 487–88 (1991).  All other public officials are extended qualified 
immunity in the exercise of their duties. See id. 
 123. See, e.g., Kehinde, supra note 121.  Nigeria has considered proposals to limit 
executive immunity only to civil suits. See Ini Ekott, Nigerians Demand Immunity Clause 
Amendment, PREMIUM TIMES (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/ 
130272-nigerians-demand-immunity-clause-amendment.html [http://perma.cc/QSZ2-
MCCW]. 
 124. See, e.g., Maïa de la Baume, A French Shift on Africa Strips a Dictator’s Son of His 
Treasures, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/24/world/europe/ 
for-obiangs-son-high-life-in-paris-is-over.html [http://perma.cc/Z6GY-E4HH]. 
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results in the threat of violence or actual violence against those seeking 
accountability.125 
Against this array of challenges, some notable exceptions in recent years 
stand out.  The Peruvian government sentenced ex-President Alberto 
Fujimori to a twenty-five-year sentence for human rights abuses related to 
his role in death squad killings during the 1990s and continues to pursue 
criminal charges against him.126  Mr. Fujimori’s third term in office ended 
abruptly after journalists recorded his top aid, Vladimiro Montesinos, 
paying bribes in exchange for the support of news outlets.127  In addition to 
his conviction for human rights abuses, Mr. Fujimori has been found guilty 
of several corruption charges.128 
There have also been widespread corruption crackdowns in Brazil, 
China, and Indonesia.  As noted earlier, Brazil recently passed the Clean 
Company Act129 and is engaged in Operacão Lava Jato, investigating an 
alleged bid-rigging scheme in which funds from contracts with Brazil’s 
state-owned oil company, Petrobras, were diverted to political parties in the 
Brazilian President’s coalition.130  To date, more than twenty-five 
individuals have been arrested and investigations have inquired into the 
affairs of forty-eight current or former legislators.131  The investigation 
touches officials at the highest level:  Brazilian lawmakers are considering 
impeachment of Brazil’s first female president, Dilma Rousseff, based on 
allegations that she knew of the corruption at Petrobras.132 
China has placed concerted emphasis on capturing public officials 
believed to have used their position for personal gain.  After assuming 
office, President Xi Jinping made anticorruption a public priority by 
pursuing both “flies and tigers” in the government.133  By late 2012, China 
 
 125. See, e.g., Simon Butt & Tim Lindsey, Comment, Joko Widodo’s Support Wanes As 
Indonesia’s Anti-Corruption Agency KPK Rendered Toothless, AGE (Apr. 11, 2015), 
http://www.theage.com.au/comment/joko-widodos-support-wanes-as-indonesias-
anticorruption-agency-kpk-rendered-toothless-20150401-1mdawv.html [http://perma.cc/ 
ESS5-PBSV]. 
 126. Robert Kozak, Peru Court Gives Fujimori a Fifth Prison Sentence, WALL STREET J. 
(Jan. 9, 2015, 2:12 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/peru-court-gives-fujimori-a-fifth-
prison-sentence-1420817941 [http://perma.cc/PM5N-JJWN]. 
 127. Ryan Dube, New Corruption Trial for Former Peruvian Leader Begins, WALL 
STREET J. (Oct. 17, 2013, 4:06 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303 
680404579141580669311764 [http://perma.cc/E95Q-MESH]. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 130. Will Connors & Luciana Magalhaes, How Brazil’s ‘Nine Horsemen’ Cracked a 
Bribery Scandal, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 6, 2015, 4:44 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
how-brazils-nine-horsemen-cracked-petrobras-bribery-scandal-1428334221 [http://perma.cc/ 
DTV9-SC3D]. 
 131. Id. 
 132. John Lyons & Paulo Trevisani, Brazil’s Economic Downturn, Corruption Scandals 
Shake Leader, WALL STREET J. (May 21, 2015, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/brazils-economic-downturn-corruption-scandals-shake-leader-1432261803 [http:// 
perma.cc/KRN2-P2XU]. 
 133. Tania Branigan, Xi Jinping Vows to Fight ‘Tigers’ and ‘Flies’ in Anti-Corruption 
Drive, GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2013, 12:44 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/ 
jan/22/xi-jinping-tigers-flies-corruption [http://perma.cc/4GNH-ECZG]. 
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reported that it had disciplined roughly 414,000 officials for corruption and 
prosecuted 201,600 officials for corruption offenses.134  This corruption 
crackdown has reached a number of high level officials:  China has indicted 
Zhou Yongkang, a former security chief and member of the Politburo 
Standing Committee,135 and is conducting investigations of sixteen major 
generals of the People’s Liberation Army.136 
In 2002, after Indonesia’s transition to democracy following the 1998 
resignation of ex-President Suharto led to worsening corruption, Indonesia 
formed the Corruption Eradication Commission137 (KPK).  In addition to 
providing education and support for local government officials, the KPK 
has investigated and prosecuted sixty-eight members of parliament and a 
number of government ministers, chief executive officers, and judges.138  In 
2014, Indonesian civil society hailed the election of Joko Widodo (who 
goes by “Jokowi”), who reformed Indonesia’s oil and gas sector and 
reduced opportunities for petty bribery by moving government services 
online.139 
The KPK does not, however, operate in an environment free from 
political pressure or retribution, and the organization regularly clashes with 
police and judiciary officials.  In 2009, the police retaliated to the 
investigation of the Head of Police Criminal Investigations by arresting two 
KPK commissioners on charges of fraud, although the commissioners were 
reinstated after evidence arose that the charges were fabricated.140  A 2012 
investigation of the chief of traffic police lead to a standoff in police 
headquarters during the execution of a KPK search that was only resolved 
by the direct intervention of the prior president, Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono.141 
Although ostensibly the election of Jokowi provided high-level support 
for the KPK, struggles with the police have increased.  In February 2015, 
President Jokowi, at his political party’s behest, nominated a candidate for 
 
 134. Macabe Keliher and Hsinchao Wu, How to Discipline 90 Million People, ATLANTIC 
(Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/xi-jinping-china-
corruption-political-culture/389787/ [http://perma.cc/7P6Y-43A5]. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Minnie Chan, 16 PLA Major Generals, Many of Them Newly Promoted, Under 
Investigation for Military Corruption, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 2, 2015, 8:48 AM), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1727199/16-pla-major-generals-many-them-
newly-promoted-under-investigation [http://perma.cc/6UQK-QRSS]. 
 137. Andrew Manners, Some Progress, but Corruption Remains Endemic in Indonesia, 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS INT’L (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/ 
indonesia/45-indonesia-swa-articles/1495-some-progress-but-corruption-remains-endemic-
in-indonesia.html [http://perma.cc/W8C5-J2ZB]. 
 138. Daniel Sagalyn, Corruption Challenges Indonesia’s Government, PBS (May 26, 
2011, 10:05 AM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/world-jan-june11-indonesia_05-26/ 
[http://perma.cc/2MCD-36HJ]. 
 139. Corruption in Indonesia:  A Damnable Scourge, ECONOMIST (June 6, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21653671-jokowis-arduous-task-cleaning-up-
government-damnable-scourge [http://perma.cc/24SM-9ULY]. 
 140. Butt & Lindsey, supra note 125. 
 141. Id. 
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the position of national police chief.142  The KPK, however, named 
President Jokowi’s nominee as a suspect in an ongoing investigation of 
public corruption.143  Amid public criticism, President Jokowi retracted the 
nomination, but suspended the KPK head and deputy after the police 
arrested them.144  As a result, the KPK has limped through the last several 
months waiting for the appointment of new commissioners in December.145 
C.  Following the Money:  
Use of Anti-Money Laundering Statutesand Asset Recovery 
Some of the national efforts mentioned above have generated 
transnational activity, both in the form of cooperative efforts and in the 
form of non-host country prosecutions or asset recovery efforts. 
1.  Anti-Money Laundering Efforts 
Although the FCPA does not reach the demand side of TNB, where the 
corrupt officials have brought the proceeds of bribery into the United 
States, the United States has used its anti-money laundering (AML) laws to 
prosecute the officials involved.  Other federal laws may be useful as well, 
particularly where the official’s conduct in soliciting or receiving the bribe 
has a territorial connection to the United States.  There have been several 
cases to date where such laws have been used to go after foreign officials 
for TNB.146  The following sections discuss these cases in turn. 
a.  Elgawhary 
In December 2014, Asem Elgawhary, a former Principal Vice President 
of Bechtel Corporation and dual U.S. and Egyptian citizen pled guilty in 
connection with a $5.2 million kickback scheme designed to manipulate the 
competitive bidding process for state-run power contracts in Egypt.147  
Elgawhary admitted that from 1996 to 2011, he was the general manager of 
 
 142. Corruption in Indonesia:  A Damnable Scourge, supra note 139. 
 143. Carol Giacomo, Editorial, Indonesia’s Corruption Fighters in the Fight of Their 
Lives, N.Y TIMES (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/20/opinion/indonesias-
corruption-fighters-in-the-fight-of-their-lives.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/XGY9-DR82]. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Corruption in Indonesia:  A Damnable Scourge, supra note 139. 
 146. The United States has also used its AML laws to prosecute foreign officials accused 
only of domestic bribery, not TNB.  The former Prime Minister of Ukraine, Pavel 
Lazarenko, was convicted of multiple money laundering counts related to corrupt extortion 
plots against Ukrainian citizens that generated millions of dollars of corrupt funds that were 
ultimately laundered through the United States. Press Release, FBI, Former Ukranian Prime 
Minister Sentenced to 97 Months in Prison Fined $9 Million for Role in Laundering $30 
Million of Extortion Proceeds (Nov. 19, 2009), https://www.fbi.gov/sanfrancisco/press-
releases/2009/sf111909a.htm [http://perma.cc/XGY9-DR82].  Lazarenko was sentenced to 
nine years in prison, fined $9 million, and ordered to pay almost $23 million in restitution. 
Id. 
 147. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Bechtel Exec. Pleads Guilty in 
Connection with a $5.2 Million Kickback Scheme (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/former-bechtel-executive-pleads-guilty-connection-52-million-kickback-scheme 
[http://perma.cc/T8V7-NHJR]. 
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a joint venture between Bechtel, a U.S. corporation engaged in engineering, 
construction, and project management, and Egypt’s state-owned and state-
controlled electricity company, a position that made him a “foreign official” 
for FCPA purposes.148  The joint venture assisted the Egyptian electricity 
company in identifying and awarding contracts to subcontractors to perform 
power projects for the company.149  Elgawhary admitted to accepting a total 
of $5.2 million from three power companies in exchange for his assistance 
in securing an unfair advantage in the bidding process.150  Elgawhary 
attempted to conceal the kickback scheme by routing the payments through 
offshore bank accounts and making false statements to Bechtel executives, 
which certified that he had no knowledge of any fraud at the joint 
venture.151  Elgawhary pled guilty to mail fraud, conspiracy to commit 
money laundering, and obstruction and interference with the administration 
of tax laws.152  Elgawhary was sentenced to forty-two months in prison in 
March 2015.153 
b.  Gonzalez 
In 2013, Maria de los Angeles Gonzalez de Hernandez, Vice President of 
Banco de Desarrollo Economico y Social de Venezuela (BANDES), 
accepted bribes to direct bond trading work to a U.S. broker-dealer, Direct 
Access Partners.154  Gonzalez pled guilty to conspiracy to violate the Travel 
Act and to commit money laundering, as well as substantive counts in 
relation to those offenses.155  As of publication, Gonzalez has not yet been 
sentenced. 
c.  Antoine and Duperval 
Robert Antoine, a former director of international affairs at 
Telecommunications D’Haiti (“Haiti Teleco”), pled guilty to money 
laundering for channeling more than $800,000 in bribes he received from a 
U.S. company.156  According to the government, he disguised the origin of 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Bechtel Exec. Sentenced to 42 Months 
in Prison & Ordered to Forfeit $5.2 Million in Connection with Kickback Scheme (Mar. 23, 
2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-bechtel-executive-sentenced-42-months-prison-
and-ordered-forfeit-52-million-connection [http://perma.cc/CH3C-MKKH]. 
 154. Nate Raymond, Two NY Broker-Dealer Execs Plead Guilty in Venezuelan Bribery 
Case, REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2014, 1:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/17/us-
venezuela-corruption-usa-idUSKBN0JV2EY20141217 [http://perma.cc/Z44P-LGKF]. 
 155. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, High-Ranking Bank Official at Venezuelan 
State Development Bank Pleads Guilty to Participating in Bribery Scheme (Nov. 18, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/high-ranking-bank-official-venezuelan-state-development-
bank-pleads-guilty-participating [http://perma.cc/AC2C-WRFN]. 
 156. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Haitian Government Official Sentenced 
to Prison for His Role in Money Laundering Conspiracy Related to Foreign Bribery Scheme 
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the bribes by passing them through intermediaries in the United States, 
thereby providing the United States with criminal jurisdiction.157  Antoine 
was sentenced to four years in prison and ordered to pay over $3.4 million 
in restitution and forfeiture.158  Jean Rene Duperval, another former director 
of international relations for Haiti Teleco, was found guilty of money 
laundering and conspiracy related to the same bribery scheme.159  Duperval 
was sentenced to nine years in prison and ordered to forfeit almost 
$500,000.160 
d.  Siriwan 
Juthamas Siriwan, the former head of the Tourism Authority of Thailand, 
has been charged with seven counts of money laundering as well as related 
conspiracy and aiding and abetting counts for her receipt of bribes 
connected to the activities of the Greens, a Hollywood producer couple.161  
The couple was sentenced in 2010 for bribing foreign officials, including 
Ms. Siriwan, to obtain lucrative film festival contracts.162  The DOJ is also 
seeking forfeiture of approximately $1.8 million in funds that the Greens 
paid Ms. Siriwan and her daughter.163  The United States claims jurisdiction 
based on its allegation that Siriwan conspired with and persuaded the 
Greens to transfer money from the United States to a foreign country for the 
purpose of paying a bribe.164  Though the charges were brought in 2009, the 
case has been stayed for several years, pending the outcome of Thai 
proceedings against the Siriwans.165 
 
(June 2, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-haitian-government-official-sentenced-
prison-his-role-money-laundering-conspiracy [http://perma.cc/JKN4-MZCF]. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Haitian Government Official Sentenced 
to Nine Years in Prison for Role in Scheme to Launder Bribes (May 21, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-haitian-government-official-sentenced-nine-years-
prison-role-scheme-launder-bribes [http://perma.cc/N8HX-QRT4]. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Indictment at 7, 16, United States v. Siriwan, No. 09-00081 (D.C. Cal. Jan. 28, 
2009). 
 162. Joe Palazzolo, Prosecutors Drop Appeal in Bribery Case Against Hollywood 
Producers, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 24, 2011, 1:43 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-
currents/2011/08/24/prosecutors-drop-appeal-in-bribery-case-against-hollywood-producers/ 
[http://perma.cc/99FZ-M8FX]. 
 163. Indictment, supra note 161, at 18–19. 
 164. Id. at 7, 16–17. 
 165. In 2013, Siriwan’s case was stayed for one year. Samuel Rubenfeld, Judge Stays 
Siriwan Case for One Year, WALL STREET J. BLOGS:  CORRUPTION CURRENTS (March 27, 
2013, 6:16 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2013/03/27/judge-stays-siriwan-
case-for-one-year/ [http://perma.cc/99FZ-M8FX].  A status conference is currently 
scheduled for October 13, 2015 to determine whether the stay should be maintained, 
although the conference has been continued numerous times. Joint Stipulation to Continue 
Status Conference at 2–3, Siriwan, No. 09-00081.  Two matters potentially could complicate 
removal of the stay.  First, Siriwan recently was indicted in Thailand. Patrick Frater, 
Juthamas Siriwan to Be Indicted As Recipient of Bangkok Festival Bribes, VARIETY (Aug. 7, 
2015, 5:32 AM), http://variety.com/2015/film/asia/juthamas-siriwan-indicted-bangkok-
festival-bribery-1201559001/ [http://perma.cc/UB9P-XZZ5].  Second, Mr. Green recently 
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e.  Ibori 
The United States is not the only country to use its AML laws to 
prosecute foreign officials.  The United Kingdom prosecuted James Ibori, 
ex-governor of Delta State, Nigeria, under its AML statutes.166  Ibori was 
extradited to the United Kingdom from Dubai after Nigeria’s Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission asked the United Kingdom to examine the 
ex-governor’s financial affairs.167  Mr. Ibori pled guilty to money 
laundering related to a $37 million fraud involving the sale of Delta State’s 
share in a Nigerian phone company.168 
2.  Asset Recovery Efforts 
In addition to individual countries prosecuting foreign officials, there has 
been increased cooperation by states in cross-border actions to recover 
proceeds of corruption.  For example, the Cayman Islands created an Anti-
Corruption Commission in 2008 whose mandate includes the ability to 
“obtain [c]ourt [o]rders to freeze the assets of those suspected of 
committing corruption offenses.”169 
International organizations have also taken up the cause.  In particular, a 
joint World Bank and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime initiative, 
the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR), has since 2007 supported 
“international efforts to end safe havens for corrupt funds.”170  StAR works 
to prevent money laundering related to grand corruption and to assist 
countries in repatriating ill-gotten gains from corruption.171  While StAR 
does not prosecute or bring cases of asset recovery, it trains developing 
countries, assists in building capacity, and provides other technical 
assistance in asset recovery efforts.172  StAR also maintains a database of 
 
passed away. Richard L. Cassin, Hollywood Producer, Once Jailed for FCPA Offenses, Dies 
in LA, FCPA BLOG (Aug. 25, 2015, 10:08 AM) http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/ 
2015/8/25/hollywood-producer-once-jailed-for-fcpa-offenses-dies-in-la.html [http://perma.cc 
/F2B7-MBM9]. 
 166. See Nigeria Ex-Delta State Governor James Ibori Guilty Plea, BBC NEWS (Feb. 27, 
2012) [hereinafter James Ibori], http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17181056 
[http://perma.cc/4RE5-SBT4]. 
 167. Id.  After his assets were frozen in the United Kingdom, Mr. Ibori returned to 
Nigeria and was arrested; a Nigerian court, however, dismissed the charges, and Mr. Ibori 
was only arrested after traveling to Dubai based on an outstanding British warrant. Id.  
Nigerian courts have since reinstated the charges. Press Release, Econ. & Fin. Crimes 
Comm’n, Money Laundering:  Ibori Has Case to Answer—Appeal Court (Aug. 19, 2014), 
http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/sites/corruption-cases/files/Ibori_Nigeria_Appeals 
_Ct_EFCC_May_15_2014_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/ESC7-XQKK]. 
 168. James Ibori, supra note 166. 
 169. What We Do, CAYMAN IS. GOV’T, http://www.anticorruptioncommission.ky/portal 
/page?_pageid=2421,1&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http:// 
perma.cc/4N9T-ZMHT]. 
 170. Our Vision, STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY INITIATIVE, http://star.worldbank.org/star/ 
about-us/our-vision (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/UX58-8Y7V]. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Our Mission, STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY INITIATIVE, http://star.worldbank.org/star/ 
about-us/our-vision (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/MFJ4-CTFV]. 
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over 750 corruption cases, with over 200 having an asset recovery 
component.173 
Perhaps the largest international recovery efforts to date relate to the 
tracking and seizing of the assets of former Nigerian military dictator Sani 
Abacha, which resulted in over $1 billion being returned to Nigeria.174  As 
of now, over $175 million in funds from Fujimori’s crony, Vladimiro 
Montesinos, have been seized and returned to Peru from a number of 
countries, including Switzerland, the United States, and the Cayman 
Islands.175  The United States, for example, returned $20 million to Peru, 
after Peru agreed to spend the money on anticorruption efforts.176  One way 
in which future acts of corruption can be combated is to require the 
repatriated funds to be spent on further anticorruption efforts. 
Despite these examples of domestic and transnational prosecution, they 
remain the exception rather than the rule.  The imbalance between supply- 
and demand-side TNB prosecution is a problem that is likely only to 
increase as supply-side prosecution increases.  While the international 
community may hope that preventive measures being implemented by 
countries, including greater transparency in the extractive industries through 
both voluntary initiatives and new disclosures requirements in certain 
countries,177 will decrease the extent of demands, the supply-side 
experience teaches that a credible enforcement capacity is essential to 
induce effective preventive efforts. 
III.  TOWARD A NEW DEMAND-SIDE FRAMEWORK 
There are multiple options for addressing this problem, ranging from 
enhanced criminal jurisdiction over the demand-side offender, to remedies 
against the offender’s state based on expanded theories of state 
responsibility, to strengthened efforts to address the structural conditions 
that lead to systemic corruption.  These tools are not mutually exclusive and 
differential approaches may be appropriate for so-called “grand” corruption 
(which may or may not be systemic) than for “petty” corruption (which is 
more likely to be systemic). 
 
 173. StAR Corruption Cases Search Center, STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY INITIATIVE, 
http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/?db=All (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma. 
cc/EGB8-4YRY]. 
 174. Cynthia O’Murchu, Asset Tracing:  Follow the Money, FIN. TIMES:  BIG READ (Aug. 
13, 2014, 7:21 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3a6cf942-222e-11e4-ad60-00144feabd 
c0.html#axzz3l3oh4YXC [http://perma.cc/MJ2S-HFUW]. 
 175. See Guillermo Jorge, The Peruvian Efforts to Recover Proceeds from Montesino’s 
Criminal Network of Corruption, in RECOVERING STOLEN ASSETS 111–12 (Mark Pieth ed., 
2008). 
 176. Id. at 120. 
 177. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(1)(A)-(q)(2)(E) (2012) (requiring issuers that engage 
in “significant actions” related to commercial development of natural resources to disclose 
payments to the U.S. or foreign governments in connection with resource development); 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative [EITI], EITI Rules, 2011 Edition, at 10 (Apr. 
2011), https://eiti.org/files/EITI_Rules_Validations_April2011_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/8JM7-
YRBA]. 
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A.  An International Criminal Tribunal 
for Transnational Economic Crime 
One option to combat demand-side bribery would be a new international 
criminal tribunal for transnational economic crime with jurisdiction over 
grand corruption, money laundering, fraud, and other serious organized 
criminal activities of a transnational nature, whether on the supply or the 
demand side.  Any agreement establishing such a tribunal would need to 
touch upon issues of immunities.178  As with some other international 
tribunals, less serious cases could be left to national tribunals,179 or its 
jurisdiction could be limited to cases in which national authorities failed to 
act after a period of time.180 
 
 178. See supra Part II.B.1.  For instance, the African Union rejects the International 
Criminal Court’s (ICC) interpretation of immunity under customary international law, which 
has led to significant hurdles in the arrest and surrender of President Omar Hassan al Bashir 
of Sudan. See Press Release, African Union, On the Decisions of Pre-Trial Chamber I of the 
Int’l Criminal Court (ICC) Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Alleged 
Failure by the Republic of Chad & the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation 
Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest & Surrender of President Omar 
Hassan al Bashir of the Republic of the Sudan (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.au.int/en 
/sites/default/files/PR-%20002-%20ICC%20English.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z8XV-TBAX]. 
  By way of background, the ICC was established by the Rome Statute, which was 
entered into force in 2002. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 
1998, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].  Presently, 123 countries are State 
Parties to the Rome Statute. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rom
e%20statute.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/C7PE-CZT8]. 
  The ICC has subject-matter jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression (although the crime of aggression is not 
defined in the Rome Statute). Rome Statute, supra, art. 5.  The ICC may exercise jurisdiction 
over these crimes if they are committed in the territory of or by a national of a Party to the 
Rome Statute. Id. art. 12(1)–(2).  There are, however, several limitations on ICC jurisdiction, 
including temporal limitations (crimes must have occurred after the relevant State became a 
Party to the statute) and limits on admissibility of cases (e.g., “the case has been investigated 
by a State which has jurisdiction of it and the State has decided not to prosecute”). Id. art. 
17(1)(b); see id. art. 11(2). 
  This Article focuses primarily on the ICC when citing examples of international 
tribunals; however, there are a number of other international tribunals that may serve as 
models to combat demand-side bribery, such as The International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone. 
 179. For example, the prosecutor for the ICC has discretion to “analyse the seriousness of 
the information received [from a referral of a crime within the ICC’s jurisdiction].” Id. art. 
15(2).  Similarly, the ICTR provides local tribunals with jurisdiction over less serious cases 
while the ICTR retains jurisdiction over serious cases. Statute of International Tribunal for 
Rwanda art. 1, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994) (stating the ICTR has “the power to 
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law. . . ”).  
This arrangement has led to some anomalies because the Statute of the ICTR excludes the 
death penalty, which local tribunals imposed in some cases before Rwanda abolished the 
death penalty in 2007. Rwanda:  Justice After Genocide—20 Years On, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Mar. 28, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/28/rwanda-justice-after-
genocide-20-years [http://perma.cc/GCP6-GJWK]. 
 180. A case before the ICC is inadmissible when the case is “being investigated or 
prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable 
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.” Rome Statute, supra note 178, art. 
17(1)(a). 
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Alternatively, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
could be expanded.181  However, because the ICC is still gathering 
support,182 and given the differing capabilities of a tribunal that deals with 
economic crime versus the types of crimes covered by the ICC,183 a 
specialized court might be preferable.  This, of course, requires the 
commitment of resources and the willingness of countries, including those 
who may stand the most to lose by the establishment of such a court.184  
The likelihood of this option gathering traction in either form anytime soon 
therefore seems remote. 
B.  International Technical Assistance 
International efforts today primarily focus on increasing enforcement of 
domestic anticorruption legislation and strengthening the rule of law in 
general and specifically around these issues.  Traditional capacity building 
focuses on training, technical assistance, and policy dialogues with local 
agencies or commissions responsible for enforcing anticorruption 
legislation.185  However, capacity building is a long-term effort and can be 
largely ineffective, especially in countries where corruption is particularly 
pervasive.186  Regardless, targeted efforts focused on particular sectors that 
are important to international business and may benefit from increased 
transparency, funding, and the like, such as customs and immigration, may 
nonetheless be beneficial. 
 
 181. See supra note 178 (discussing the jurisdictional reach of the ICC). 
 182. The Rome Statute allows the ICC to initiate cases on its own accord “on the basis of 
information” and without the referral of a party. Rome Statute, supra note 178, art. 15(1).  
As a result, the ICC is criticized for the politicization of its exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion, whether that be in the ICC’s investigation of the Israeli-Palestinian war in Gaza, 
its focus on the prosecution of African leaders, or its general potential to infringe on a Party 
State’s sovereignty.  See, e.g., Aminta Ossom, An African Solution to an African Problem?  
How an African Prosecutor Could Strengthen the ICC, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. DIG. 68, 69 (2011) 
(“[T]he increasing influence of the ICC reflects a deepening commitment among many 
Western states despite greater reservations among the African countries whose enthusiasm 
had originally buoyed the Court.”); Peter Beaumont, ICC Urges Israel to Cooperate in 
Inquiry into Possible Breaches in Palestine, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2015, 7:24 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/may/13/icc-urges-israel-to-cooperate-in-inquiry-into-
possible-breaches-in-palestine (“Israel, however, has denounced the Palestinian action as 
‘scandalous,’ with prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu warning that it turns the ICC ‘into 
part of the problem and not part of the solution.’”) [http://perma.cc/5DYM-7JG4]. 
 183. See supra note 178. 
 184. Numerous hurdles prevent such an expansion at the current time, not least of which 
is disagreement as to what constitutes public corruption.  Although an international 
consensus may be developing related to the core conduct that constitutes public corruption, 
consensus seems unlikely for behavior on the margins.  It takes only mild imagination to 
envision a foreign court indicting U.S. legislators who exchange votes on contested 
legislation for campaign support or district-specific appropriations. See supra note 45 and 
accompanying text (discussing definitional difficulties in the context of the U.N. 
Convention). 
 185. See Int’l Dev. Law Org., Anti-Corruption:  A Capacity Building Approach, DEV. 
LAW UPDATE, no. 7, at 6 (2006). 
 186. See Anna Persson et al., Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption As 
a Collective Action Problem, 26 GOVERNANCE 449, 454 (2013). 
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C.  Special Commissions 
A third way exists to combat demand-side bribery for countries willing to 
cede some amount of prosecutorial discretion.  International organizations 
can establish, by agreement, independent prosecutorial commissions to 
target organized crime and public corruption. 
One such example is the International Commission against Impunity in 
Guatemala (CICIG), established in a 2006 agreement between Guatemala 
and the United Nations.187  The CICIG, with U.N. assistance, works with 
the Guatemalan Public Prosecutor’s Office and National Civil Police to 
investigate crimes committed by members of illegal security forces and 
clandestine security “structures.”188  The CICIG wields exceptional power, 
including the ability to join criminal proceedings as a complementary 
prosecutor and to “[s]elect and supervise an investigation team made up of 
national and foreign professionals of proven competence and moral 
integrity . . . .”189  As of September 2013, the CICIG had participated in 
twenty cases that resulted in guilty verdicts.190  Although CICIG 
investigations focus primarily on members of the National Civil Police and 
members of the judiciary, two CICIG prosecutions related to public 
corruption.191  For example, CICIG obtained an October 2013 conviction of 
five individuals, including the mayor of La Antigua, Guatemala, for 
diverting municipal funds slated for construction.192  Recently, the CICIG 
worked with Guatemalan prosecutors in an investigation of Guatemala’s 
then-sitting President, Otto Perez Molina, regarding allegations of graft and 
bribery.193  As a result, Molina was indicted and jailed pending disposition 
of the charges.194 
Guatemala is experiencing a period of sustained, organized violence and 
members of the National Police, military, and judiciary are implicated in 
many killings.195  The CICIG represents an unusual response:  inviting 
 
 187. Agreement Between the United Nations and the State of Guatemala on the 
Establishment of an Institutional Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, Dec. 12, 
2006, [hereinafter CICIG Agreement], http://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/mandato 
/cicig_acuerdo_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/C7SG-Z2FF]. 
 188. Mandate:  Agreement to Establish CICIG, CICIG, http://www.cicig.org/index.php? 
page=mandate (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/KTR7-ENVM]. 
 189. CICIG Agreement, supra note 187, art. 3(1)(j). 
 190. CICIG, Convictions in Proceedings Supported by CICIG, at 1 (Sept. 11, 2013), 
http://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/2013/SENT-20131018-01-EN.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
5DBZ-5H6N]. 
 191. See id. at 2 (detailing Case 001076-2012-0025); id. at 11–12 (detailing Criminal 
Case 01070-2010-00309). 
 192. See id. at 2 (detailing Case 001076-2012-0025). 
 193. Sonia Perez D., Guatemala’s Rock Star:  Quiet Jurist Who Took Down President, 
YAHOO! NEWS (Sept. 12, 2015, 7:19 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/guatemalas-rock-star-
quiet-jurist-took-down-president-040531388.html [http://perma.cc/4GMC-XV5E]. 
 194. Sonia Perez D., Judge Orders Guatemala Ex-President Perez Molina Jailed While 
Facing Fraud and Bribery Charges, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Sept. 8, 2015, 6:44 PM), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/09/08/judge-orders-ex-guatemalan-
president-jailed-on-fraud-charge [http://perma.cc/CR7A-NP9Z]. 
 195. See David Grann, A Murder Foretold:  Unravelling the Ultimate Political 
Conspiracy, NEW YORKER (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/ 
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foreign, impartial experts to investigate and prosecute expansive crime that 
domestic constituencies are unable to accomplish themselves.  The 
organization is alternatively lauded for its impact on the country or 
criticized for the unchecked and unbridled use of power.196 
While the impetus for CICIG derived from human rights concerns, its 
model has potential application for economic crime as well.197  Partnerships 
between countries and international organizations could allow enforcement 
of domestic demand-side laws in consultation with domestic prosecutors.  
Under these partnerships, the host country would maintain prosecutorial 
discretion, build enforcement capacity, and gain public credibility.  These 
international organizations would stand outside normal government 
channels and yet still be an effective means for increasing government 
legitimacy in states facing grand and petty corruption.  The perception of 
corruption in the justice system often can be as debilitating as actual 
corruption, and therefore the presence of an impartial international 
investigative and prosecutorial organization would preserve the appearance 
of propriety if a country’s investigation of high-level public officials 
yielded no evidence of corruption.  Of course, this approach requires the 
consent of the host country—for example, in the CICIG accord, the 
Guatemalan government requested assistance from the United Nations.198  
Nonetheless, a special commission could be a useful tool for strengthening 
the capacity of a willing state. 
D.  Transnational Prosecution of Demand-Side Bribery 
Another alternative to combat demand-side bribery is transnational 
prosecution, particularly of “grand” corruption, based on universal or other 
enhanced jurisdiction standards.  As noted above, the U.N. Convention 
permits but does not require countries to assert jurisdiction on this basis.199  
The implementation of this provision requires legislation at the national 
level, and a number of countries have done so to date.200  An effective 
international effort would require implementation by an even greater 
number of countries, particularly those countries that are attractive 
destinations for tourism, business travel, and the like.  However, there are 
 
04/04/a-murder-foretold [http://perma.cc/8BG8-EDND]; CICIG, supra note 190, at 9 
(detailing Case 01070-2009-00883). 
 196. See Grann, supra note 195. 
 197. There is increasing appreciation of the linkages between corruption and human 
rights.  Corruption can affect the use and enjoyment of a variety of human rights, perhaps 
most importantly access to justice. See Human Rights Council, Progress Rep. of the Human 
Rights Council Advisory Comm. on the Issue of the Negative Impact of Corruption on the 
Enjoyment of Human Rights, at 5 ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/42 (May 14 2014), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session26/Documents/A_HRC_
26_42_ENG.DOC [http://perma.cc/F9XL-R9SF]; Param Cumaraswamy, Speech at U.N. 
Conference on Anti-Corruption Measures:  Good Governance and Human Rights:  Integrity 
and Ethics 11 (Nov. 8–9, 2006), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/ 
GoodGovernance/Cumaraswamy.pdf [http://perma.cc/9BBY-PRR8]. 
 198. CICIG Agreement, supra note 187, pmbl. 
 199. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra Part I.C. 
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still significant practical and legal hurdles that this alternative must 
overcome before gaining traction and widespread acceptance. 
First, even if countries criminalize demand-side TNB as a substantive 
crime, one of the key obstacles to actually prosecuting that crime will be 
exercising jurisdiction over the foreign public official.  As discussed above, 
the various anticorruption conventions take different views as to what bases 
of jurisdiction are mandatory or permissive.201  Territorial jurisdiction, as 
required by all conventions, is the easiest, but requires the foreign official to 
have acted in the prosecuting nation,202 which may not always occur.  
Nationality jurisdiction, where the prosecuting nation takes jurisdiction over 
the acts of its nationals overseas, will not be helpful for prosecuting those 
who are, by definition, not nationals of the country.203 
In addition to territorial and nationality jurisdiction, international law 
recognizes additional bases for jurisdiction—protective, passive 
personality, and universal jurisdiction—that might be used to prosecute 
demand-side TNB.204  It is unclear, however, how effective these additional 
bases of jurisdiction would be.  For example, while acts of grand corruption 
might be prosecutable under a theory of universal jurisdiction,205 certainly 
there is no such consensus as to acts of petty corruption.206  A new 
instrument would likely be necessary. 
In addition to jurisdictional hurdles, considerations of comity also arise in 
prosecutions of demand-side TNB, as well the treatment of immunities 
under national and international law.  Furthermore, questions of double 
jeopardy arise.  Due to this, before starting a prosecution of demand-side 
TNB, a nation should be required to determine if the home country of the 
foreign official is unable or unwilling to prosecute the offense itself.  If the 
answer is negative, the prosecuting nation should defer to the home state.  If 
the answer is positive, then the prosecuting nation should proceed with its 
prosecution. 
There also may be specific resistance in the United States to prosecuting 
foreign officials in U.S. courts.  Opening U.S. courts to disputes that have 
 
 201. See supra Part I.B. 
 202. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 203. Cf. Part II.C.1.a (discussing the case of Elgawhary, where a U.S. citizen was 
considered a foreign official).  Additionally, to the extent a national from the prosecuting 
nation is an official with an international institution, nationality also could be the basis of 
exercising jurisdiction over that individual.  However, these situations would seem to be 
exceptional. 
 204. Protective jurisdiction allows a state to punish a limited set of offenses that 
“threaten[] the integrity of governmental functions that are generally recognized as crimes by 
developed legal systems, e.g., espionage, counterfeiting of the state’s seal or currency, 
falsification of official documents, as well as perjury before consular officials, and 
conspiracy to violate the immigration or customs laws.” RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD):  
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1986) 
(emphasis omitted).  The passive personality principle allows a state to apply its criminal 
laws to an extraterritorial act committed by a nonnational when the victim of the crime is a 
national. Id. § 402 cmt. g. 
 205. This proposition is lamentably still debatable. 
 206. Facilitating payments, which are permitted under U.S. law but prohibited under U.K. 
law, is the prime example of this. See supra notes 28, 76 and accompanying text. 
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no nexus with the United States has been a recent concern of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.207  Additionally, at least one U.S. court has held that, as 
currently written, foreign officials cannot be prosecuted for conspiracy to 
violate the FCPA because “Congress knew it had the power to reach foreign 
officials in many cases, and yet declined to exercise that power.”208  Due to 
the current state of the law, any criminalization of demand-side TNB in the 
United States would necessarily involve amendments to the FCPA or other 
legislative action in order to make the cases that interpret the current 
version of the FCPA moot. 
Given the lack of progress in recent years to amend the FCPA in ways 
intended to limit its reach,209 and given the concerns of U.S. business about 
the lack of demand-side enforcement,210 the prospects of legislation that 
would “level the playing field” between the supply and demand sides may 
be more favorable than would appear at first blush.  Concerns should be 
anticipated, however, regarding the reciprocity impact of such legislation, 
as well as the issues highlighted above.  Therefore, conditioning such 
jurisdiction on a clear nexus of the conduct to the United States (for 
example, through the impact that bribe solicitation had on U.S. firms or 
persons) would be an important limitation. 
E.  National Law Measures Targeting Individuals:  
Building on “No Safe Haven” 
When taken in concert with other countries, domestic restrictions 
targeting foreign public officials guilty of demand-side bribery can have a 
significant impact.  The United States’s best-known action is the “no safe 
haven” policy implemented in Presidential Proclamation 7750 on January 
12, 2004.211  The proclamation restricted, “[i]n light of the importance of 
legitimate and transparent public institutions,” international travel and 
suspended entry into the United States of persons “who have committed, 
participated in, or are beneficiaries of corruption in the performance of 
public functions” if the corruption has “serious adverse effects” on U.S. 
businesses, foreign assistance or national security, or on “the stability of 
democratic institutions and nations.”212  Since 2004, U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement has denied over 139 individuals obtainment of entry 
 
 207. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) 
(holding that the Alien Tort Statute does not apply extraterritorially). 
 208. United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 835 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-
640, at 12 n.3) (“United States has power to reach conduct of noncitizens under international 
law.”). 
 209. See, e.g., ANDREW WEISSMAN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL 
REFORM, RESTORING BALANCE:  PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT 28 (2010), https://www.uschamber.com/restoring-balance-proposed-
amendments-foreign-corrupt-practices-act [http://perma.cc/CM3P-JND4]. 
 210. See Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV 781, 795–800 (2011). 
 211. Proclamation No. 7750, 69 Fed. Reg. 2287 (Jan. 12, 2004). 
 212. Id. 
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visas to the United States and has compiled over 66,000 “subject records” 
for blocked individuals.213 
Prior to 2010, the United States did not vigorously enforce Presidential 
Proclamation 7750.214  Several sources criticized the United States for 
allowing the continued entry of Teodoro Nguema Obiang, the President of 
Equatorial Guinea, even though “most if not all” of his assets were believed 
to be derived from corruption involving Equatorial Guinea’s oil and gas 
reserves.215  Under pressure, the Obama Administration increased 
enforcement thereafter.  In 2010, then-Attorney General Eric Holder 
announced the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative at the African Union 
Summit to combat “large-scale foreign official corruption” and recover 
“public funds for their intended—and proper—use.”216  After filing suit 
against Mr. Obiang’s son’s property in 2012, the United States entered into 
a settlement in October 2014, which required the liquidation of assets found 
in the United States.217  The funds were placed in a settlement account and 
distributed to a charity chosen jointly by Mr. Obiang’s son and the United 
States.218 
Compounding the lack of enforcement, Proclamation 7750 has little 
deterrent effect because enforcement records are not released.  Visa 
determinations and corresponding rationales are required by statute to 
remain confidential, even from the applicant.219  Simply because 
enforcement actions are not made public, however, does not mean 
Proclamation 7750 has had no effect.  For example, a confidential August 
27, 2004 telegram from the U.S. embassy in Jakarta to Washington, D.C., 
disclosed by WikiLeaks, “established an interagency working group to 
identify major Indonesian corruptors” and stated that “Indonesian officials 
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indicate that the GOI [Government of Indonesia] welcomes the judicious 
implementation of PP7750.”220 
Existing legal authorities would allow for the public disclosure of those 
denied entry under this policy.  The President has the authority to make a 
proclamation, as he or she “may deem to be appropriate,” to suspend the 
entry of aliens into the United States if their entry “would be detrimental to 
the interest of the United States.”221  This power allows the President to 
circumvent restrictions on the publication of visa determinations and has 
been used in numerous instances to publicly deny entry into the United 
States of Specially Designated Nationals and other blocked persons.  For 
example, on March 8, 2015, President Obama signed Executive Order 
13,692, which blocks the property and suspends entry of seven individuals 
named in the Annex to that Executive Order believed to be responsible for 
or complicit in human rights abuses in Venezuela.222 
The United States has access to stronger policy measures as well.  When 
endemic corruption’s impact threatens the national security, foreign policy, 
or economy of the United States,223 the President can declare a national 
emergency and invoke the powers in the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act224 (IEEPA).  The President regularly invokes IEEPA 
to block the property of individuals, such as Specially Designated 
Nationals, when their property enters the custody of a U.S. person.225  
Publishing the names of foreign officials guilty of grand corruption would 
place them alongside specially designated terrorists and human rights 
abusers.  All U.S. persons, including banks, businesses, and service 
providers, would be prohibited from dealing with those individuals.226 
The use of IEEPA complements international efforts to publicly track 
and block the assets of high-ranking public officials guilty of demand-side 
bribery.  As noted above, StAR keeps a database of active corruption 
cases.227  To prevent money laundering and facilitate the identification of 
corrupt officials, StAR lobbies for additional due diligence in the banking 
sector for individuals identified as Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs)—
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those officials in a position capable of engaging in large-scale corruption.228  
The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has recommended 
implementing those reforms through legislation to reduce the opportunities 
corrupt foreign public officials have to use the United States to hide 
assets.229  Groups such as Transparency International have made disclosure 
of corporate beneficial ownership a major priority as part of its initiative to 
“[u]nmask the [c]orrupt.”230 
The United States could also use its voice and vote in the World Bank 
and other IFIs to push those institutions to take concerted steps against 
countries that are systemically failing to prevent and remediate bribery and 
corruption in their development projects.  This would be most effective, 
obviously, if done in conjunction with other countries.  U.S. legislation 
already directs the use of voice and vote in these institutions toward certain 
policy objectives, so this would simply be an extension of that approach.231  
The World Bank and other IFIs are uniquely positioned to influence country 
behavior, especially of the poorest countries that are the focus of their 
lending. 
F.  National Law Measures Targeting Countries:  
Naming and Shaming 
Beyond measures targeting individuals, the United States also has tools 
to bring diplomatic pressure to countries in the bribery and corruption 
arena.  Such “naming and shaming” strategies are similar to those employed 
by nongovernmental organizations, such as Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions and Bribe Payers Indices.232 
The United States already publishes some reports for similar purposes, 
such as the Special 301 Report, in which the U.S. Trade Representative 
identifies foreign countries that “deny adequate and effective protection of 
intellectual property rights, or deny fair and equitable market access to U.S. 
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persons that rely upon intellectual property protection.”233  Those reports 
classify countries on “Priority” and “Watch” lists and include an 
investigative section on each country that summarizes the status of its 
individual intellectual property protections.234  The purpose of the Special 
301 Report is not enforcement:  sanctions cannot be invoked unless 
consistent with a ruling of the World Trade Organization Dispute 
Settlement Body.235  Rather, the Special 301 Report provides visibility 
about the status of intellectual property protections and publicly places 
diplomatic pressure on other countries to comply with that country’s 
obligations. 
Since 2002, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation has conditioned 
development assistance support on countries’ satisfaction of certain 
governance and anticorruption criteria.236  The publication of watch lists 
with a particular focus on the anticorruption policies and current 
enforcement environment in countries that present demand-side bribery 
challenges would complement this approach.  A focus on the domestic 
capacity and willingness of foreign countries to prosecute demand-side 
bribery can serve the dual purposes of providing visibility to corruption 
risks and placing diplomatic pressure on those countries to implement 
reforms. 
G.  State Responsibility 
Finally, consideration could be given to establishing as a ground of state 
responsibility in international law the sustained and systematic failure of a 
state to prevent, detect, and remediate bribery and corruption.  While a full 
examination of this topic is beyond the scope of this Article, the emergence 
of an international consensus, as reflected in the treaties discussed earlier, 
that states have duties to take measures to combat corruption is an 
important first step in developing such a theory.237  Analogies may be 
found in other areas of law, such as health, safety, and the environment, 
where a “failure to prevent” theory has been used as a basis for state 
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responsibility.238  Such a theory would allow a state whose interests have 
been harmed by another country’s persistent unremedied corruption to bring 
a state-to-state claim in international tribunals. 
CONCLUSION 
As enforcement of supply-side TNB statutes increases, the need for 
effective enforcement on the demand side increases as well.  While a legal 
framework for demand-side prosecution is emerging, additional tools are 
needed.  Some tools may be better focused on grand corruption with 
transnational impacts, while others focus on petty corruption, whose 
structural causes may be more easily remedied through technical assistance 
and other similar strategies.  Some tools may be national in origin, while 
others would require action at the international level.  This Article has 
endeavored to outline preliminarily a range of potential tools for further 
consideration. 
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